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1.1       BACKGROUND 
For many, the word piracy brings to the mind the amazing adventures and activities 
of Johnny Depp as Jack Sparrow, the villain in the movie „The Pirates of the 
Caribbean‟ which eulogised and romanticised the pariah that today‟s pirate has 
undoubtedly become. The reality is that the scourge that piracy is has gripped the 
shipping industry by its jugular. It has led to colossal loss in all sectors of the 
shipping industry, and is particularly felt in the marine insurance sector. The menace 
of piracy did not however, spring up overnight, and has constituted a problem right 
from the days of yore when man first started to conquer the oceans in his quest for 
riches, fame, adventure and discovery of new lands. 
 
Piracy has been known to be in existence as far back as the 13
th
 century B.C and 
particularly flourished during the 1600‟s and 1700‟s which was known as the golden 
age of piracy.
1
 Pirates are aptly described as dared vil sea predators who attack and 
plunder ships and rob them of valuables, cargoes, money and at times even steal the 
ship in whole for conversion to further their nefarious activities and purposes. Pirates 
were fearless (and still remain so) without respect for persons or country and thus it 
happened that the great Julius Caesar of the Roman Empire was once kidnapped by 
pirates and held captive until his ransom was paid. In retaliation, he assembled a fleet 
after his release, chased after the pirates, succeeded in capturing them and thereafter 
executed them.
2
 This disregard of national authority is very much the same situation 
regarding present day piracy as pirates will attempt to capture any vessel regardless 
of whether or not such a vessel flies the flag of a world superpower. 
 
Piracy and the activities of pirates were never restricted to any particular part of the 
world and appeared to have surfaced in every part of the world‟s waterways which 
ships plied as commercial routes for the purposes of transportation of goods and 
people.  Pirates were known and classed in reference to the areas of the world‟s 
oceans and seas in which they operated and also in relation to where the pirates 
originated from. Therefore, there were pirates who were known as the “Pirates in the 
                                                          
1
 „A brief history of piracy: royal naval museum library‟. Available at 
www.royalnavalmuseum.org/info_sheets_piracy.htm  [Accessed 6 June 2011].  
2
















Orient” who operated in the waters close to Japan and India;
3
 “Mediterranean 
pirates” who sailed and operated in the Mediterranean sea; “Pirates of the Caribbean” 
who operated in the Caribbean sea. There were a host of others.  
 
The trademark of pirates and which still remains the present day position was the 
violent takeover, plunder and robbery of ships. Though pirates did not necessarily 
engage in needless taking of lives as long as their victims did not put up much 
resistance, this did not remove the fact that countless numbers of lives were lost as a 
result of the activities of pirates. However, it is pertinent to note that the acts of 
piracy have sometimes been linked with the acts of privateers and acts of terrorism, 
while there seems to be a thin line dividing these different acts of violence, there is 
indeed a distinction to be made between them which becomes pertinent in relation to 
marine insurance policies and the possibility of an assured losing its ability to be 
indemnified. A distinction will be made in Chapter Two between piracy and these 
other concepts. 
 
1.2 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter One entails an introduction to the concept of piracy and its journey to 
modern status and position of piracy. The chapter gives a general view of the thesis 
and sets out the significance and objectives of the thesis. 
 
Chapter Two analyses the distinction between piracy and other related concepts. The 
chapter takes a look at the definition of piracy and how it is viewed from different 
jurisdictions. It examines how piracy is viewed in the marine insurance industry and 
how this perspective differs from that held by the shipping industry and the United 
Nations. The chapter examines the shortcomings of the various definitions of piracy 
and how these shortcomings have created lapses in the fight against piracy and most 
especially how definitions affect the insurance contract between the insurer and the 
assured.  
 
Chapter Three examines the causes of piracy and the reasons why it appears piracy 
has come to stay, at least for the time being on the high seas. Special emphasis will 
be placed on the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Guinea and the South China Sea with case 
studies and the reasons for their being seen as a core factor in the fight against piracy.  
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Chapter Four examines the various insurance policies and how present day piracy 
has affected the cover given by these policies in relation to acts of piracy vis a vis  
the insurer- assured relationship. An analysis will also be made of how the marine 
insurance industry, most especially, in the London market, has responded to the 
increased and frustrating level of acts of piracy in recent years. The various pirate-
endemic areas analysed in Chapter Three are considered in appraising how the 
piratical activities in these areas have affected the present position taken by the 
insurer in its continued effort to insure piracy as a peril. The vital issue of ransom 
payment is examined in detail, most especially in relation to the view taken by the 
judiciary and various jurisdictions with regard to the legality of the payment of 
ransom.  
 
Chapter Five examines the measures taken by the international community to combat 
piracy. It examines the counter measures taken by the shipowners to deter piracy. It 
also analyses the success of these measures and takes a look at upcoming 
developments to curb this scourge.  
 
Chapter six is the conclusion in which the author suggests certain workable remedies 
to combat piracy.  
 
1.3 Objective of Thesis 
This thesis has the aim of analysing the metamorphosis of piracy into its present day 
status as a menace and how it has impacted most especially on the marine insurance 
industry. The marine insurance industry is basically comprised of the relationship 
between the assured (shipowner/cargo owner) and the insurer, and the nexus which 
creates the relationship between these parties lies in the marine insurance policy 
which is taken out by the assured and underwritten by the insurer. There is no doubt 
that the peril of piracy is one of the perils the assured would want to insure against in 
any marine adventure most especially in view of the surge of pirate attacks in recent 
times. This thesis therefore provides an examination of the response of the marine 
insurance industry to confront the various challenges and effects brought about by 
piracy. In analysing the role of piracy in relation to the marine industry, emphasis 
will be placed on the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea and the region of South Sea 
Asia. The reason for this focus is because of the strategic role they play in the 
















lanes for most of the world‟s ocean plying vessels and also in view of the fact that 
the greatest number of attack by pirates have been recorded in these regions more 
than any other part of the world. Emphasis will also be placed on English law, in 
view of the fact that many of the insurance policies taken out in the marine insurance 






































2 PIRACY AND RELATED CONCEPTS DISTINGUISHED 
Piracy has been confused with certain related concepts which have certain 
characteristics in common with the concept of piracy . For the purpose of this thesis, 
the need to establish the difference between piracy and these related concepts 
becomes pertinent in view of the fact that an assured who has been insured against 
the risk of piracy under a marine insurance policy, could suddenly become exposed 
in a situation where the insured peril of piracy becomes beclouded by the elements of 
these related concepts which have similar characteristics with piracy.  
 
2.1      Piracy and Privateers distinguished 
 There seems to be a thin line between piracy and privateering. Both are characterised 
by the use of violence and force in their operation. However, a number of scholars 
present the argument that there is a clear distinction between pirates and privateers. 
Privateering came about in 1243 when the first Letter of Reprisal was issued by King 
Henry III of England.
4
 The letter gave a license to privateers to attack ships of enemy 
states without the fear of sanctions. 
 
A privateer is essentially an armed ship issued with a document from a government 
known as a “Letter of Marque and Reprisal”
5
 and the men who controlled a privateer 
were also referred to as privateers.
6
 These letters of marque and reprisal constituted 
government authority granting a commission to private shipowners to attack, plunder 
and seize ships
7
 of a hostile state. Privateering was in reality piracy which was 
recognised and given legitimacy by a state and by international law.
8
 Virtually all 
states recognised the rights of other nations to issue a decree of privateering.
9
 A ship 
captured by a privateer was taken to the court of admiralty of the commissioning 
state which was known as the prize court, to be determined whether or not that ship 
was a lawful prize,
10
 in other words to confirm if that ship had been taken within the 
ambits of the letter of marque and reprisal issued to the privateer. Where the taking 
                                                          
4
 Pirate Encyclopaedia  „English privateers.‟ Available at 
www.ageofpirates.com/article.php?Englishprivateers [Accessed 8 June 2011]. 
5
 Pirates of the Caribbean „What be a pirate?‟ Available at 
www.blindkat.hegewisch.net/pirates/diff.html  [Accessed 8 June 2011]. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 CK Marshall „Putting privateers in their place: the applicability of the marque and reprisal clause to 
undeclared wars‟ (1997) 64 U. Chi. L. Rev 953 at 954. 
8
 E Kontorovich „The piracy analogy: modern universal jurisdiction's hollow foundation‟ (2004) 45 




















of the vessel was proved to be lawful, the vessel was condemned as prize, sold and 
the proceeds were split between the government and the privateer. The person who 
bought the prize possessed a superior title against even the owner regardless of the 




The important and vital role which privateering played could be seen in its utilization 
during the American Revolution, when the American colonies declared 
independence from Great Britain.
12
 The American naval forces could not go into a 
headlong confrontation with the British navy which at that time was the world‟s most 
powerful.
13
 The panacea to the situation was the resort of the Americans to 
privateering which they utilized by enacting laws for letters of marquee and reprisal
14
 
which made lawful the seizure of British ships and cargo with the motive of 
disrupting British commerce. Privateering indeed posted military victories for the 
Americans in the War of Independence and the War of 1812.
15
 Privateering was 
eventually abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, but many states including 
the United States and Spain refrained from joining the treaty.
16
 However, the issuing 
of the letter of marquee was stopped by the United States after the war of 1812, 




The brotherhood of piracy and privateering was reflected in the nature of the 
execution of their operations which involved the attack, plunder and seizure of ships 
and at times the killing of those on board the ships in cases where stiff resistance was 
put up. The consanguinity was delineated only by the issuing of the letter of marquee 
which rendered the privateer immune to charges of piracy
18
 without which he would 
be branded a pirate and would be condemned to the gallows if caught. However, it is 
important to note that a privateer was regarded for all purposes and at all times as a 
pirate by a hostile and belligerent state if caught by that state. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Kontorovich (note 8) at 213-214. 
12
 J Frayler „Privateers in the American revolution.‟ Available at www.nes.gov/revwar/about_ the 




 Marshall (note 7) at 961. 
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2.2 Piracy and Maritime Terrorism distinguished 
There are several divergent views concerning the nexus between piracy and 
terrorism, while some exponents argue that piracy and terrorism are so interwoven as 
to constitute one and the same crime, there are others who hold the contrary view 
that there is a fine line of distinction between the two. The words „terrorism‟ and 
terrorist were first made use of during the French Revolution and the use of the word 
“terrorism” originated in 1795 in reference to the Revolutionary government‟s reign 
of terror.
19
 Terrorism stems from an ideological basis
20
 and employs violence as its 
primary weapon of projection against a perceived opposition. The essential 
characteristic of terrorism is its political motivation fuelled by religious 
fundamentalism, ethno-nationalist demands, and ideology
21
 in contrast to an 
economic one. There is no contest that terrorism and especially maritime terrorism 
bears a semblance to piracy as both crimes indulge in the use of violence at sea, 
nevertheless the two crimes are not one and the same.  
 
The basic distinction between the two crimes stem from the “private versus political 
nature of the violence”.
22
 Unlike the thin line of distinction which exists between 
piracy and privateers, there appears to be a quite a gulf of distinction which exists 
between piracy and terrorism. Piracy unlike terrorism has no political undertone, the 
motivation for piracy is exclusively an economic one, the fact that in recent times 
terrorists have now engaged pirate-like tactics in the shipping industry in perpetrating 
their evil acts does not detract from the fact that violent acts in order to be considered 
acts of piracy must have certain elements which include the use of violence, that the 
act must be committed by one vessel against the other
23





                                                          
19
 „Early history of terrorism‟. Available at www.terrorism-research.com/history/early.php [Accessed 
12 June 2011]. 
20
 International law „From piracy to terrorism‟. Available at www.law-
teaching.group.shef.ac.uk/law3018/index.php/chapter_6_-_international_law:_from_piracy 
[Accessed 4 July 2011]. 
21
 C Vallar „Pirates & privateers; The history of maritime piracy-piracy versus terrorism‟.  Available 
at www.cindy vallar.com/terrorism.html. [Accessed 10 July 2011]. 
22
 T Garmon „Reconciling the law of piracy and terrorism in the wake of September 11
th‟ 
(2002) 27 




















Another major distinction between piracy and terrorism lies in the fact that “piracy 
on the high seas is a universal crime and can be repressed by any nation, while 
repression of terrorism on the high seas is legally confined to  
particular nations and circumstances”.
25
 Furthermore terrorists, apart from their 
political ideologies, also carry out their activities with the additional motivation of 
attracting as much attention as possible to their cause and plight and also aim to 
wreak as much disaster and havoc as possible, while pirates on the contrary seek to 
avoid attention as much as possible “and will inflict only as much harm and damage 
as is necessary to accomplish their mission”.
26
 In relation to target, “victims of piracy 
have to be „materially satisfying‟ to the criminals”.
27
 Pirates have no code as regards 
the nationality, race or religion of their targets as long as there is gain to be had. 
Terrorists on the contrary identify and choose their targets with specific motives in 
mind. However, there is no doubt that piracy and terrorism continue to become more 
entwined by the day as terrorists have now resorted to attacking ships not only as a 
mark of expressing their political objectives, anger, resentment and beliefs, but also 
as a tactic in generating funds to further their evil motives. 
 
The case of the Achille Lauro presents a classic example of the interwoven nature of 
piracy and terrorism. The Achille Lauro was a cruise ship carrying about 400 
passengers at the time it was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists who demanded the 
release of 50 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. They killed a disabled 69 year old 
American tourist and threw his body and wheelchair overboard. The hijackers 
eventually surrendered after two days in exchange for safe passage. The Achille 
Lauro incident shows how terrorists have now employed the use of piratical acts in 
trying to achieve their evil motives. It will be noted that the United States deemed the 
incident as an act of piracy, though the general view is that the incident was one 
purely of maritime terrorism.  
 
There is no contest that while piracy is an evil phenomenon which has plagued 
mankind from the days of old,
28
 maritime terrorism has only recently manifested 
itself with the hijacking of the Achille Lauro “serving as a wake-up call”.
29
  
                                                          
25
 GG Ony-Webb Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing The Malacca Straits  (2006) at 86.  
26
 Ibid at 88. 
27
 J Xu „Piracy as a maritime offence: some public policy considerations‟ (2007) J.B.L. Sep, 639 at 
646. 
28
 H Tuerk „Combating terrorism at sea: the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of 
















2.3 Definition of Piracy 
There is a deluge of definitions of piracy arising from various sources, notably 
international law, customary law, case law and even municipal law. In spite of this 
wealth of definitions on piracy, a common factor which characterises these various 
definitions is that they are fraught with shortcomings in providing an all 
encompassing definition of piracy. Let us examine these definitions arising from 
various quarters and their significance. 
 
2.3.1 Definition under Customary International Law 
Despite the fact that piracy is one of the oldest crimes known to man, no 
authoritative definition of piracy was known to exist under customary international 
law.
30
 Disputes whether piracy encompasses an intent to rob; whether acts of 
insurgency aimed at overthrowing a government should be given piratical 
recognition; whether the piratical act must be compulsorily committed by one ship 
against  another or could occur on the same ship; all contributed to a deadlock in 




2.3.2 Definition under 1958 Geneva Convention and 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
In contrast to customary international law, article 101 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy as follows: 
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property 
on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State; 
 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b)”
32
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
29
 Tuerk (note 28) at 365. 
30
 M Halberstam „Terrorism on the high seas: the Achille Lauro, piracy and the IMO convention on 
maritime safety‟ (1988) 82 A.J.I.L 269 at 272.  
31
 Ibid at 272-273. 
32
















This provision is a verbatim reproduction of Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas.
33
 Certain problematic issues arise from the provisions 
of this convention which are examined below. 
 
I    The High Seas Prerequisite 
The provisions of article 101 limit the crime of piracy to the „high seas‟ which means 
that the crime “can only take place within clearly prescribed locations, those being 
the high seas or a place outside the jurisdiction of any State”.
34
 The basis for 
restricting the definition of piracy to attacks on the „high seas‟ probably evolved 
from the belief that the crime “interfered with international shipping on the high seas. 
If this interference occurred in territorial waters, the coastal state could resolve this 
situation by enacting its own municipal legislation”.
35
 Therefore, piratical acts 
committed in a country‟s territorial waters are not deemed as piracy under the 
Convention
36
 which has certain worrisome effects. Piracy is considered as the 
original foundation for universal  
jurisdiction which bestows upon “every state the jurisdiction to pursue, arrest, and 
prosecute pirates on the high seas”
37





The UNCLOS prerequisite of an attack to occur on the high seas for it to be deemed 
an act of piracy, constrains the ability of states to harness the concept of universal 
jurisdiction in employing their warships to investigate, arrest or capture pirates which 
venture into the territorial waters of a host state.
39
 This position creates some 
problems; firstly, pirates may enjoy some form of immunity from a warship in hot 
pursuit once they get into the territorial waters of a third state;
40
 secondly, offenders 
who are caught may escape prosecution unless the coastal state has a municipal law 
which defines and prescribes sanctions for acts of piracy;
41
 thirdly, pirates will be 
                                                          
33
 Garmon (note 22). 
34
 D Doby „Piracy Jure Gentium: the jurisdictional conflict of the high seas and territorial waters‟ 
(2010) 41 J. Mar. L. & Com 561 at 567. 
35
 BH Dubner „Human rights and environmental disaster - two problems that defy the "norms" of the 
international law of sea piracy‟ (1997) 23 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 1 at 17.  
36
 Doby (note 34) at 567. 
37
 Ibid at 568. 
38
 See Articles 100, 105 &111 of UNCLOS. 
39
 Doby (note 34) at 569. 
40
 Article 111 (3) provides that “The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the 
territorial sea of its own State or of a third State”. 
41
















able to attack commercial ships in states which lack the wherewithal, resources and 




Therefore, Somalia‟s territorial waters, lacking a national military presence and the 
authority of a functional government would be out of bounds. This would constitute 
a barrier to foreign warships attempting to apprehend  
pirates as those warships must retreat in their pursuit of pirates as soon as those 
pirates cross over into Somalia‟s territorial waters.
43
 It has therefore been suggested 
that states should seek an amendment of the provisions of UNCLOS to erase the high 
sea requirement.
44
 The writer is in agreement with this suggestion and is of the 
opinion that the right of innocent passage
45
 which constitutes an exception to the non 
entry of ships of war into a coastal state‟s territorial sea should be extended to cover 
the pursuit of pirates by foreign warships into foreign territorial waters since pirates 
are regarded as hostis humanis generis
46




II      The Private End Prerequisite 
As stated earlier, there is a thin line of distinction between piracy and privateering 
which was basically the „Letter of Marque‟ issued by a commissioning government 
which gave legal recognition to the piratical acts of the privateers. In other words 
privateering was no more than “state sponsored piracy”
48
 by which a percentage of 
the proceeds garnered by the privateers was remitted to the state on a profit sharing 
formula basis. It could be said that the gradual emergence of a definition of piracy in 
international law
49
 brought about the need to distinguish between privateering which 
was commissioned by governments and which was nothing more than „glorified 
piracy‟ and those acts of piracy which had failed “to comply with the formalities of 
licensing”
50
 and thereby lacked legal backing and which were deemed to be for 
private purpose.  
                                                          
42
 EC Stiles „Reforming current international law to combat modern sea piracy‟ (2004) 27 Suffolk 
Transnat'l L. Rev 299 at 323-324. 
43
 Doby (note 34) at 570-571. 
44
 Stiles (note 42) at 323-324. 
45
 Articles 17 & 45 of UNCLOS grants the right of innocent passage to ships passing through a state‟s 
territorial sea. 
46




 Doby (note 34) at 565-566. 
48
 M Madden „Trading the shield of sovereignty for the scales of justice: a proposal for reform of 
international sea piracy laws‟ (2009) 21 U.S.F Mar.L.J 139 at 143. 
49
 Madden (note 48) at 144. 
50
















In view of these historical circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the „private 
end‟ prerequisite was incorporated into the definition of piracy
51
 in the 1932 Harvard 
Draft Convention on Piracy (Harvard Draft),
52







However, it is perplexing that the „private ends‟ prerequisite continues to remain in 
the present day definition of piracy. It may be said that while there was a need for the 
„private ends‟ prerequisite up till and around the 19
th
 Century in order to distinguish 
between state recognised privateering and acts of piracy not sanctioned by the state,
55
 
there appears to be no clarity regarding the reason for the persistence of the private 
ends prerequisite in the definition of piracy long after privateering had ceased to 
exist.
56
 Madden is of the opinion that the reason could be that piracy was not 
considered a pervasive problem by the comity of nations when the Harvard Draft 
Convention was been compiled and that the researchers had for reasons of simple 
expediency adopted an archaic definition of piracy which had originated from the era 
of privateering.
57
 The reality is that piracy has now evolved to be a monster that has 
become a pervasive problem and coupled with the „death of privateering‟, the private 
end prerequisite is no longer tenable and is now outdated. 
 
III    The Two Ships Prerequisite  
In accordance with the provisions of article 101 of UNCLOS, an attack must be 
carried out by one ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft for it to be deemed 
to be an act of piracy. The reasoning behind the „two ships‟ prerequisite stems from 
the belief “that acts committed onboard a single ship were deemed to be of concern 
to only the vessel's flag state, and were not properly the subject of international 
law”.
58
 Therefore, it would mean that those instances where the crew of a ship seized 
the ship or where possession of such a ship was taken over by the passengers or 
where the passengers or the crew engaged in appropriation of the cargo on board the 
ship,
59
would not legalise the intervention of a foreign warship seeking to apprehend 
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the culprits on the grounds of piracy.
60
 The reality of the present day situation is that 
pirates do not necessarily have to commit their crimes from another ship, but could 
well do so from within a ship on which they are on board. Thus in relation to this 
development, Malvina Halberstam had this to say “In the past, pirates used one ship 
to attack another and the motive was material gain. Today, terrorists such as the 
hijackers of the Achille Lauro seize a ship, threaten its passengers and kill them 
without regard to the flag it flies or the nationality of the victims. That they do so by 





The hijacking of the Achille Lauro shows that pirates can employ the same tactics 
used by the hijackers to carry out their activities from within a ship. The „two ships‟ 
prerequisite has now become obsolete and there is no contesting the fact that the 
definition of piracy is in dire need of overhauling and piratical attacks such as 
hijacking and suicide bombing ought to be reined into a modernised definition of 
piracy regardless of the fact that these acts occur on board a single ship.  
 
2.3.3 The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) definition 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialised division of the 
International Chamber of Commerce and was established to combat maritime crime 
and malpractices.
62
 Piracy is defined by the IMB as:  
“An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent 
to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability 




The definition of piracy by the IMB is broad and incorporates any attack on a ship 
regardless of its being anchored, berthed or at sea.
64
 However, the IMB‟s definition 




                                                          
60
 Jesus (note 59). 
61
 Halberstam (note 30) at 298. 
62
 International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau „Piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, annual report 1January – 30 December 2007‟ at 1. Available at 
http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/_dataimages/IMBannual.pdf  [Accessed 14 July 2011] 
63
 International Chamber of Commerce-International Maritime Bureau  (note 62) at 3. 
64
 DR Dillon „Maritime piracy: defining the problem‟ SAIS Review, Volume 25, Number 1, 2005 at 
155. Available at  http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais/summary/v025/25.1dillon.html  [Accessed 2 
August 2011]. 
65

















2.3.4 Definition of Piracy in relation to Marine Insurance Contracts  
In view of the realisation that the various definitions of piracy inadequately provide 
an all encompassing definition for the modern day phenomenon of piracy, it 
therefore becomes pertinent to have a definition of piracy relied on by the marine 
insurance sector. A look will be taken at the judicial perspective of what 
encompasses piracy in relation to a marine insurance contract. 
  
The Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 codifies insurance law and in Rule 8 of the 
Rules for Construction defines pirates as including “passengers who mutiny and 
rioters who attack the ship from the shore”.
66
 However, this definition is not 
exhaustive and reference must be made to case law for further clarity on the concept 
of piracy.
67
 The case of Nesbitt v Lushington
68
 appears to be the earliest reported case 
on the subject. Here the vessel Industry, while she was at Elly harbor was boarded by 
rioters and the captain was compelled to sell the cargo of corn at three quarters of the 
actual value to the rioters. The cargo-owners insurance claim, submitted to the 
insurers was however, refused on the grounds that the loss was not covered under the 
policy. The court though holding that the cargo-owner could not recover under the 
policy, nevertheless declared that the loss occurred as an act of piracy and held that 
“Whatever would be robbery at land is piracy at sea. Obliging the owners of corn by 
force to sell it on shore for a particular price imposed by the buyers themselves, 
would certainly be robbery”.
69
 The court further held that “…I think that this loss 
falls within a capture by pirates: and if a particular average could have been 
recovered upon this policy, the plaintiffs might have recovered upon the count, 
stating the loss to have happened by piracy…”.
70
 In Palmer v Naylor,
71
 the Chinese 
emigrants on board a ship killed the captain along with some of the crew members 
and gained possession of the ship with the aim of sailing to the nearest place they 
could effect an escape after which they now returned the ship to the remainder of the 
crew. The insurers rejected a claim submitted to it by the plaintiff and upon an action 
brought by the plaintiff, the court in holding that the emigrant‟s actions amounted to 
piracy held inter alia that “The admitted seizure of the vessel by them, the taking her 
out of the possession and control of the master and crew….were either direct acts of 
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piracy or acts so entirely ejusdem generis ….they are clearly included within the 




The case of Republic of Bolivia v Indemnity Mutual Assurance Co ltd
73
 is the locus 
classicus on this subject,
74
 in which case the Court of Appeal gave a detailed 
interpretation of piracy. Here the plaintiff, the Republic of Bolivia, insured goods 
which were to be transported on board The Labrea under a policy which covered loss 
by piracy. The vessel was seized during the voyage by insurgents and the goods were 
subsequently lost, upon which the Bolivian government claimed on the insurance 
policy, but which claim was rejected by the insurers, upon which the plaintiff 
therefore sued. The judgment of the trial judge was upheld by the Court of Appeal 
which affirmed that the loss was not caused by an act of piracy and defined what 
constituted an act of piracy as:  
“…a man who is plundering indiscriminately for his own ends, and not  
a man who is simply operating against the property of a particular state   for 
a public end, the end of establishing a government, although that act may be 
illegal and even criminal, and although he may not be acting on behalf of a 
society………..Such an act may be piracy by international law, but it is not, I 
think,  piracy within the meaning of a policy of insurance; because as  I have 
already said, I think you have to attach to „piracy‟ a popular or business 
meaning, and I do not think, therefore, that this was a loss by piracy...”
75
 
   (The underlining is mine for emphasis) 
 
The definition of piracy was given further clarity by the case of Athens Maritime 
Enterprises Corporation v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd. 
(The Andreas Lemos).
76
 The issues of ascertaining if piracy was constituted by a vital 
element of force or the threat of force,
77
 and also whether the concept of piracy was 
confined to the territorial sea
78
 came to the fore in this case. As regards the first 
issue, the court held inter alia that “… theft without force or a threat of force is not a 
piracy under a policy of marine insurance”.
79
 The court further held that: 
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“The association, by the word “piracy” insures the loss caused to 
shipowners because their employees are overpowered by force, or terrified 
into submission. It does not insure the loss caused to shipowners when their 
night-watchmen is asleep……and thieves steal clandestinely. The very notion 




Concerning the second issue, the court was of the opinion that no rationale existed 
for confining piracy to attacks beyond the territorial sea. The court held that  
“In the context of an insurance policy, if a ship is in the ordinary meaning of 
the phrase “at sea”…..or if the attack upon her could be described as “a 
maritime offence”…..then for the business purposes of a policy of insurance 
she is…….in a place where piracy can be committed”.
81
 
(The underlining is mine for emphasis) 
 
This case therefore lays down the principle that in the context of marine insurance, 
the definition of piracy is not confined to the high seas, but extends to the territorial 
waters which is in contrast with the definition of piracy laid by UNCLOS 1982 
which confines piracy to attacks on the high seas alone. On the other hand, the case 
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3 MODERN MARITIME PIRACY 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is pertinent to examine the concept of piracy in the 
face of present day realities and this examination will be conducted with emphasis on 
the piracy endemic areas. This analysis becomes crucial in view of the fact that the 
intrigues of modern day piracy plays a vital role in influencing the events in the 
marine insurance industry, most especially as regards the position taken by insurers 
in relation to the cover of piracy as a peril in a marine insurance policy.  
 




C for a 
number of reasons which include: 
 An upsurge in the size and speed of merchant vessels due to advanced 
technology which left pursuing pirates at a disadvantage. 
 Increased naval patrols of most of the world‟s waterways. 





In view of the above factors, it was thought at one time that piracy was a nightmare 
of the past. However, the truth of the matter is that piracy had always been around. 
The factors outlined above which led to a decline in piracy have now reversed 
themselves to aid the progression and growth of piracy.
83
 The same technology 
which offered protection to modern vessels as a result of increased size and speed 
and which  led to the manufacture of more advanced vessels which requires fewer 
crew has also aided the pirates in improving their weapons of speed, shock, surprise, 
fire power and rapid escape.
84
 Most countries in the world now have reduced navies 
which have drastically reduced the number of ships capable of patrolling vast areas 




The unhappy reality is that piracy is now back with full force and with a meaner and 
ever unrepentant side to it. Gone are the days when pirates operated with cudgels, 
cutlasses, pistols and crude weapons. The 21
st
 C pirate now operates with rapid fire 
weapons, rocket propelled grenade launchers and emboldened by the huge ransoms 
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paid for the release of hijacked vessels, they now have enormous resources which 
they can fall back on. A tab has been kept on the activities of pirates by the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as far back as 1995 and the escalating increase 
in the attacks of pirates over the years is indeed frightening. The IMB reported that 
445 attacks were carried out against ships by pirates in 2003; 329 attacks were 
reported in 2004; 276 attacks were reported in 2005; 239 attacks were reported in 
2006; 263 attacks were reported in 2007.
86
 In 2011, the IMB reported that there were 





3.1 Types of Piracy  
There are basically three kinds of pirates. There is the “Minor Armed Robbery”
88
 
which refers to those opportunistic attacks which occur in the vicinity of the coast 
and in the ports.
89
 These are pirates who engage in petty robbery and opportunity 
theft by gaining entry to the ship while she is in the port or at anchor and steal 
anything
90
 they can lay their hands on such as money, crewmen‟s personal effects, 
ropes and even paint.  
  
The second kind is the “Armed Robbery and Aggression of Intermediate Degree”
91
 
which refers to violent actions which involves the theft of boats in territorial waters 




The third kind is the “Serious Criminal Hijacking”
93
 which involves the hijacking of 
ships by large armed gangs of well trained men.
94
 These pirates hijack the ship and 




                                                          
86
 Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report, International Chamber of Commerce, Jan 
1- Dec 31, 2007. 
87
 ICC Commercial Crime Services „Piracy news and figures‟ (2011). Available at http://www.icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures. [Accessed 20th August 2011]. 
88
 WV Bush and T Rettig „Covering maritime piracy in South East Asia‟.  Available at 
www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_10478-1522-2-30.pdf?090414112801. at 19 [Accessed 20th August 2011]. 
89
 Bush and Rettig (note 88). 
90
 K Petretto „Weak states offshore-piracy in modern times‟ at 8 Available at 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/HSF_PiracyInModernTimes_WeakStaesOff-
Shore.pdf. [Accessed 24th August 2011]. 
91
























3.2 Regional Variations of Piracy 
Piracy has been referred to as a movable crime and as a result there is the constant 
factor of new trouble spots popping up from time to time.
96
 However, certain regions 
have acquired the unenviable reputation of been notorious as constant hotbeds of 
piracy. The frightening level of piracy in these regions have also affected in no small 
measure the position taken by the marine insurance industry as regards the insurance 
policies  and the reasons for their notoriety will be analysed below. 
 
3.2.1 Southeast Asia- Malacca Straits, South China Sea, Indonesia. 
The region of South Sea Asia “extends to the South China Sea in the north, and 
Indonesia in the south”.
97
 The region occupies a very important position in the world, 
this is because more than half of the world‟s sea bound traffic passes through the 
region
98
 and the reason for this is not farfetched. “Some of the most densely 
populated countries of the world”
99
 abound in the area of the South Sea Asia 
including Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, all boasting strong economies which are 
reliant upon imports and exports.
100
 Furthermore a number of countries in the region 
also produce agricultural products and minerals which are in great demand both 
within and outside the region and the marketing of these resources depend upon a lot 
of export and import.
101
 These factors contribute to make South Sea Asia the busiest 
shipping region in the world, which also contains the Malacca Straits – “the most 
heavily trafficked sea lane in the world”.
102
 However, the strategic position occupied 
by South Sea Asia has also brought upon it a curse- the scourge of pirates. The heavy 
commercial activities makes the region a lucrative hotbed for the activities of pirates 
and the geographical set up of the region constitutes the ultimate ally for the pirates.  
The region contains a very high number of islands which the pirates use as bases to 
carry out their nefarious activities
103
 and the dense vegetation present on these 
islands affords the pirates the perfect hiding place.
104
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The activities of pirates in South East Asia was so bad between 2000 and 2006, that 
out of the 2,463 pirate attacks in the world, about 1,125 occurred in South East Asia 
of which Indonesia accounted for two-thirds of the reported pirate attacks in the 
region.
105
 So bad did the situation become that the Lloyd‟s Market Association‟s 
Joint War Committee (JWC) classified the Malacca Straits as „highly prone to piracy, 
war strikes, terrorism and related perils for ocean shipping‟ which resulted in an 
increase of insurance premiums for vessels which were transiting through  
the straits.
106
 However, as a result of the recent decrease in the attacks of pirates in 




This decrease in the spate of pirate attacks in South Sea Asia is the result of various 
regional security initiatives to counter piracy such as the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia 
(RECAAP), the annual meeting of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies 
(HACGA), the Cooperative Mechanism for Maritime Safety and Environment 
Protection in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the MALSINDO patrols formed 




3.2.2 Gulf of Aden- the Somalia Piracy War  
The Gulf of Aden lies between Yemen and Somalia and over 21,000 ships transit this 
area annually, with about 11% of the word‟s petroleum passing through the gulf on 
its way to the Suez Canal.
109
 The Gulf of Aden is well known not only for its 
ecological richness and strategic importance as a vital shipping route, but also for its 
notorious level of piracy which is orchestrated mostly by pirates operating from 
Somalia. Piracy has experienced an explosion of frightening magnitude off the coast 
of Somalia in recent years
110
 such that urgent and various initiatives are been taken to 
checkmate the menace posed by this problem. However, piracy did not spring up 
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overnight in the Gulf of Aden and is actually the result of a series of chain reactions 
in Somalia which has now produced the cataclysmic effect of what has now become 
the „hydra headed monster‟ of the Gulf of Aden. 
 
The genesis of Somalia‟s piracy can be traced to the fall of the Gen. Siyad Barre 
regime in 1992 and the disintegration of the Somali Navy and Police Coastguard 
services.
111
 A large number of fishing communities had evolved along the Somali 
coastline as a result of severe draughts in 1974 and 1986 and had found succor and 
refuge by engaging in fishing as a predominant means of livelihood.
112
 Following the 
fall of the Siyad Barre regime, a civil war erupted which led to a vacuum in power 
with no government to administer affairs, illegal fishing vessels from Europe soon 
took advantage of the situation and began to heavily poach Somalia‟s enormous 
fishing resources thereby competing with the locals and depriving them of a means 
of livelihood.
113
 The Somali local fishermen “whose industry was always small-
scale, lacked the advanced boats and technologies of their interloping competitors, 
and also complained of being shot at by foreign fishermen with water cannons and 
firearms”.
114
 Illegal vessels and trawlers came from as far as Japan, Spain and North 





This situation led to confrontations between the illegal vessels and the local 
fishermen who fought for the preservation and protection of their fishing turf,
116
 the 
extent of the activities of these illegal vessels could be seen in the comments of one 
of the fishermen- Jeylani Shaykh Abdi, when he said “They are not only taking and 
robbing us of our fish, but they are also trying to stop us from fishing”.
117
 Another 
problem which came about was the dumping of nuclear and toxic waste in Somali 
waters which also angered the locals, this evil dumping of harmful waste led to the 
                                                          
111
 MA Waldo „The two piracies in Somalia: why the world ignores the other?‟ Available at 
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_09/Jan/Waldo/08_The_two_piracies_in_Somalia.html 






 ITharoor  „How Somalia‟s fishermen became pirates.‟ Available at 




 Waldo (note 111). 
117
 Ibid. (Another fisherman- Mohamed Hussein was also quoted as saying that the international 
community was "talking only about the piracy problem in Somalia, but not about the destruction of 
our coast and our lives by these foreign ships." See MA. Waldo „The two piracies in Somalia: why 
















outbreak of all sorts of respiratory ailments and skin diseases amongst the villagers 




The culmination of these factors led to the local fishermen arming themselves and 
thus began the Somali piracy war. The piracy saga first started with the Somali 
pirates seizing the illegal trawlers which operated without licenses who quickly made 
the ransom payments since the owners of these vessels didn‟t want any attention 
drawn to their violation of international maritime law. This emboldened the pirates 
and only served to whet their appetites for more money.
119
 These pirates constituted 
themselves into „self appointed coast guards‟ charged with the aim of protecting 
Somalia‟s fishing resources.
120
 “It soon became impossible to distinguish between 
vessels that were seized for illegally fishing and vessels that were simply seized”.
121
 
The Playa de Biako was a Spanish fishing ship which was hijacked in April 2008 by 
Somali pirates and its crew taken hostage
122
,the ship was eventually released after a 
ransom payment of  $1.2 million.
123
 It was suggested by critics that the ship was 
fishing very close to Somalia‟s territorial waters, but the ships log recorded it had 




The Somali pirates are presently responsible for the greater percentage of the pirate 
incidents worldwide. In the first quarter of 2011, there were about 142 reported 
attacks worldwide and this sharp rise was attributed to pirate attacks off the coast of 
Somalia which accounted for 97 of the attacks reported worldwide.
125
  Out of the 18 
ships hijacked worldwide within the first three months of 2011, 15 of them were 
hijacked off the coast of Somalia
126
 and as at the last count on 31
st
 March, figures 
released by the IMB also showed that about “596 crew members on 28 ships” were 
been held captive by Somali pirates.
127
 Captain Pottengal Mukundan  the Director of 
the IMB observed the frightening increase in the activities of the Somali pirates and 
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said “We‟re seeing a dramatic increase in the violence and techniques used by pirates 




3.2.3 Gulf of Guinea- Piracy in West Africa with emphasis on Nigeria 
It would appear that most of the world‟s pirate attacks occur in the Gulf of Aden and 
South Sea Asia and as such one might be tempted to think that ships sailing in other 
regions of the world are far from harm and have less to fear, however, this is not the 
case. One region which appears to be fast acquiring an infamous reputation for pirate 
attacks is the Gulf of Guinea and most especially the country of Nigeria. The Gulf of 
Guinea has been reported to be second to Somalia in terms of pirate attacks
129
 and 
the deluge of pirate attacks in recent times in the region has given the international 




Piracy is not a new phenomenon in West Africa.
131
 Until recently, Nigeria accounted 
for more reported cases of pirate attacks in its waters than those of Somalia.
132
 
“Between 1982 and 1986, West Africa - particularly Nigeria - had the highest 
reported number of cases of piracy and armed robbery”.
133
 The Somali pirates 
appeared to have taken the forefront in the number of attacks launched by pirates, 
such that not much attention was given to the West-Africa region, but it seems that 
the spate of attacks recorded in Nigerian waters in recent years have attained 
alarming proportions to put it on the world radar. In view of this worrisome situation, 
the IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan commented that “Whilst Somalia is, rightly, 
getting a lot of media attention for its piracy problems, a worrying trend is emerging 
off the coast of Nigeria. We have noted a higher level of violence in attacks off 
Nigeria than any other region in the world”.
134
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In October 2009, a product tanker was the subject of an attack by pirates off Lagos in 
Nigeria who opened fire on the ship and eventually gained entry into the 
vessel.
135
The pirates took all the crewmen hostage, assaulted them and thereafter 
made away with valuables, cash, and personal belongings.
136
 There were 25 reported 
pirate attacks in Nigerian waters in 2009, most of which were cases of robbery in 
contrast to hostage taking.
137
 The present spate of pirate attacks which has made 
Nigeria to become second to Somalia in pirate attacks incidents has a political origin 
which stems from the grievances held by the indigenes of the Niger-Delta region 
who were aggrieved by the fact that their communities had been neglected and 
marginalised by the Federal Government of Nigeria over the years despite the fact 
that their region produced the oil wealth of Nigeria. They also decried the destruction 
and the pollution of their marine environment by the multinational oil companies 
which engage in the oil exploration in the Niger-Delta and their seemingly 
nonchalant attitude in cleaning up the mess caused by their oil exploration activities. 
 
The culmination of these factors and the tough stance taken by the government in 
dealing with the perceived rebellious nature of the people of the Niger-Delta which 
was at first non-violent resulted into catastrophic effects. Various militant groups 
emerged with the prominent one being the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND). These militant groups held the oil industry by the jugular by 
coordinating various attacks against oil installations in the country which led to a 
sharp drop in Nigeria‟s oil production. It soon ballooned into kidnapping of 
expatriate oil workers and hijacking of vessels. Despite the fact that the Nigerian 
government granted an amnesty to the militants in 2009 which has seen most of the 
militant groups laying down their arms and calling a truce with the government, there 
are still widespread cases of piracy taking place within and off Nigeria‟s Coastal 
waters. Criminal gangs in the name of fighting for justice for the neglect of the 
Niger-Delta have executed a high number of pirate attacks on vessels including 
fishing trawlers. The Fishing Zone of the Nigerian Merchant Navy Officers and 
Water Transport Senior Staff Association in 2010 raised concerns over renewed 
attacks by pirates on fishing trawlers.
138
 The group‟s Administrative Secretary 
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observed that despite the militants having been granted amnesty by the government, 




However, it is interesting to note that the Nigerian government appears to have 
contrary views as to the nature of the attacks carried out on vessels off the Nigerian 
Coast. The Nigerian government is opposed to the IMB‟s verdict “which rated 
Nigeria as the second most pirate-prone country in the world”.
140
 This view was 
expressed when the Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and 
Safety Agency (NIMASA) who represents the Nigerian governments position was 
reported as saying that the attacks in Nigeria are not pirate attacks, but attacks by 
„armed robbers‟ and that most of these attacks were instigated by foreign fishing 
trawlers who were interfering with Nigerians in the fish trawling business.
141
 He 
further stated that most of the attacks reported by the IMB are false alarms and that 
what was been experienced were „little arms attacks‟ and that there was nothing like 
piracy in Nigeria
142
. This view taken by the Nigerian government would perhaps 
suggest the reason why it appears that enough has not been done to counter the 
activities of pirates in the region. As long as the Nigerian government continues to 
maintain this stand that there is little or no piracy off the coast of Nigeria, then it 
means ships transiting the Gulf of Guinea will continue to be at the mercy of pirates. 
 
3.3 Root Causes of Contemporary Piracy 
Piracy is attributable to certain root causes irrespective of which region the atrocity is 
being perpetrated in. Each root cause manifests itself under different circumstances 
in each part of the world which then leads to the ultimate end result- piracy. Let us 
examine these root causes and under which situations and circumstances they have 
germinated and metamorphosed into the menace of piracy using the various piracy 
endemic regions as cases studies. 
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State weakness constitutes a core factor in the cause of piracy. This weakness stems 
from various factors confronting the state and it is consequently reflected by the 
inability of the government of a state to effectively exercise control over its territorial 
waters and the adjacent waters in which pirates carry out their operations.
144
The 
factors include amongst other things political upheaval, massive corruption, social 
unrest and internal strife. These major flaws results in the reality that proper 
mechanisms and institutions are either not in place or are inadequate to project any 
deterrent measures against piracy and they will be considered below.  
 
I. Gulf of Aden 
In the Gulf of Aden which lies between Yemen and Somalia, the weak state 
institutions provide a safe haven and conducive environment for pirates to operate 
with no fear of being apprehended.
145
 The Failed State Index 2011 saw Somalia 
ranking “as number one for the fourth consecutive year citing widespread 
lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism, insurgency, crime, and well-
publicised pirate attacks against foreign vessels”
146
 as the basis for arriving at this 
ranking. There has been no effective government in charge of administering the 
country‟s affairs ever since the regime of Gen Siyad Barre was toppled in 1992, the 
Transitional Federal Government which represents the authority which the 
international community recognises as the representation of Somalia is under 
consistent attack by the Islamist militias
147
 and is only in control of parts of 
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The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) headed by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed took 
control of Mogadishu in June 2006
149
 and was in control for a period of six months 
before it was ousted by Ethiopian troops backed by the United States in December 
2006. However, during the brief period of authority held by the ICU, it is important 
to note that piracy virtually vanished, this was due to the fear the pirates had for the 
backlash of the sharia law which was imposed by the ICU. Donna Nincic of  the 
ABS School Maritime Policy and Management at the California Maritime Academy 
commented thus “As the ICU exerted its control, they declared piracy a crime and 
imposed strict penalties (including cutting off both hands); as a result, piracy dropped 
to only ten attacks in 2006. After the ICU was ousted and the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) returned to nominal power, Somalia soon became one of the 
world‟s major piracy „hot spots‟ and came to be considered a safe haven for al-
Qaeda”.
150
 This development during the reign of the ICU shows just how important it 
is to have an effective and operational government.  
 
The situation with the government in Yemen constitutes a tricky situation which 
appears on the face value to be fair when compared to that in Somalia. The 
government in Yemen is trying to project itself as a part of the solution to the 
problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, but some observers say that Yemen which is a 
failed state might be part of the problem.
151
 There is a sympathy in Yemen for the 
Somali pirates which is shared by both civilians and officials alike
152
 and which runs 
so deep that it is suggested by some Yemeni officials that “the extensive international 
attention to piracy is just a pretext for big powers like the U.S. to gain control of the 
Gulf of Aden, a waterway through which millions of barrels of oil pass every 
day”.
153
 Ahmed al-Asbahi, a member of the Yemeni parliament was recently 
reported as saying that “What the international community should do is help bring a 
real and lasting peace to Somalia. If they do this, then there won't be any piracy. 
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Various factors handicap the Yemeni government and makes it weak in combating 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden: the government faces regional opposition by the Southern 
movement in the Southern provinces which since 2007 have been seeking 
secession;
155
 the Huthi rebels operating from the North-Western province of Sa‟dah 
constitute a growing problem for the government;
156
 a stronghold has been 
established by Al Qaeda in Yemen most especially in the provinces east of the 
capital Sana‟a.
157
 The Failed State Index 2011 ranked Yemen as number thirteen in 
the world
158
 putting all these factors into consideration. These factors coupled with 
dwindling oil resources which are fast running out and which has forced the 
government to cut its budget in half for 2011
159
 pose a myriad of problems which has 
made the Yemen government weak in its resolve to combat piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden. 
 
II. Gulf of Guinea-West Africa 
The West African countries of Gabon, Nigeria, Ghana, Cameron, Cote devoir, 
Guinea, Benin, and Sao Tome and Principe constitute the coastline states of the Gulf 
of Guinea. This region is well known for its vast pool of oil resources, second only to 
the Persian Gulf.
160
 However, the region has also been besieged with a surge in 
piracy which is second only to that of the Gulf of Aden. The ability of most of the 
countries in this region to prevent and combat piracy is weakened by political 
violence, corruption, ethnic segregation and insurgency which have affected the 
ability of these countries in putting the right mechanisms and facilities in place. 
Nigeria, which is regarded as a „powerhouse‟ in the region and which should be 
taking the front-lead in combating piracy in the  region is currently bedeviled with 
issues of massive corruption, government recklessness, ethnic strife and religious 
conflicts which have all contributed in no small terms to the weakness of the 
Nigerian government in preventing piracy in the region.  
 
Nigeria‟s ability to combat piracy is crucial to eradicating piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea because the criminal gangs and militants which operate from the Niger Delta 
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region of Nigeria are largely responsible for the pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, 
and the helplessness of the Nigerian government to rein in the militants is a classic 
example of how state weakness can cause piracy. The decay of corruption which has 
eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigerian government has seen resources which 
would have been used to provide facilities and mechanisms in combating piracy 
diverted to private pockets in government in a mad rush for personal enrichment.  
 
The Nigerian navy has been starved of funds due to the high level of corruption so 
much so that even the few ships it has are of “uncertain operational readiness”
161
 and 
as a result its efficiency in mounting an effective campaign to thwart or prevent the 
wave of pirate attacks in the region is greatly handicapped.  
 
III. South East Asia-Malacca Straits 
The Malacca Straits is mostly located within the territorial seas of Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia,
162
 and the safety of the straits is the primary responsibility 
of these coastal states.
163
 In spite of the numerous efforts by these three states to 
improve safety, the level of piracy still remains high in the straits.
164
 Recent efforts 
by these coastal states under the trilateral effort code named MALSINDO,
165
 to curb 
piracy are bedeviled by inadequate patrol arrangements and the lack of sufficient 
resources, and of which Indonesia warrants particular concern.
166
 The Failed States 
Index 2011 rates Singapore and Malaysia as number 157 and 111
167
 respectively 
which suggests that the situation in these countries are fair and stable. Indonesia on 
the other hand is rated as number 64 in the Failed States Index 2011, a position 
which is not enviable in any way when compared to that held by Singapore and 
Malaysia. Most of the pirate attacks take place in Indonesia‟s waters due to its lack 
of necessary resources to undertake effective patrol of its waters.
168
 This issue of 
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inadequate resources has consequently resulted in the underfunding of the Indonesian 
navy and the maritime police, thereby making the country weak in countering piracy.  
 
A core political factor which has also weakened Indonesia‟s governance capabilities 
to fight piracy has been the activities of the separatist movement known as Gerakan 
Aceh Merdeka (GAM) which had campaigned for the independence of Aceh since 
the mid 1970‟s,
169
 and had embarked upon insurgent attacks upon the Indonesian 
government which met the acts of insurgency with cruel suppression tactics. A peace 
deal was however, brokered between the two sides in 2005 via a memorandum of 
understanding signed in Helsinki, Finland which has largely reduced the likelihood 
of another outbreak of conflict between the two parties. 
 
 All these problems bedeviling Indonesia has made it “the locus of the problem in 
Southeast Asia”.
170
  It is interesting to note that in the face of all these setbacks, 
Indonesia has “rejected the possibility of extra-regional patrols of the Strait”
171
  
which was suggested by the United States, citing the threat to its national sovereignty 
as the ground for the rejection.   
 
3.3.2 Economic Disillusion  
This factor is a wide umbrella which encompasses the issues of poverty and 
corruption. These twin issues have contributed in no small measure to the present 
level which piracy has attained. There is no doubt that these issues act as a stimulant 
to spur people who feel they have no economic hope thereby seeing piracy as a way 
of making ends meet. We shall be taking a look at how these factors have acted as a 
catalyst in promoting piracy to its present status once again using the piracy endemic 
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I. Gulf of Aden 
There is no gainsaying that there is a nexus between piracy and poverty.
172
 “Poverty 
is the driving force behind the increase in piracy, not just off the coast of Africa, but 
in the Caribbean, South America, India, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia”.
173
 Somalia 
as it is now has not always been the epitome of violence, poverty, misrule and all 
negative attributes which permeate present foreign perceptions of that country. 
However, years of warfare fuelled by the greed and endless power tussle between 
tribal warlords have brought the country to its present predicament. For many in 
Somalia, piracy is about the only way to earn a „good living‟. In a country which has 
been ravaged by war, famine and internal strife and the average person‟s survival is 
hinged upon a sum of less than two dollars a day,
174
 piracy becomes an irresistible 
allure to beat back adversity. It is the assertion of most of the fishermen who have 
turned to piracy that the brazen depletion of their county‟s fishing resources by 
illegal foreign trawlers and the evil dumping of nuclear waste on their shores have 
made it extremely difficult for them to eke out a living and as such they see piracy as 
a convenient way out. The quick and easy money pirates earn from the ransoms paid 
to them is an invigorating tonic for more and more Somalis to become recruited into 
the piracy web regardless of the dangers associated with it. The seductive pull of the 
huge ransoms garnered yearly from the acts of piracy has led many Somalis to 
believe that piracy dividends offer hope for a better tomorrow. This belief is well 
reflected by Helen Kennedy‟s comments that “Modern-day piracy is growing quickly 
into big business - just take a look at the booming Somali pirate port of Eyl. Big 
villas and hotels are sprouting, former subsistence fishermen are driving Mercedes-




There is no doubt that piracy is illegal, atrocious and its effects quite devastating, but 
the reality of the situation is that the average Somali will continue to regard piracy 
and its huge ransom reward as the „ultimate get out plan‟ to confront poverty as long 
as the present economic, social and political upheaval continues to prevail in 
Somalia. Peter Chalk, a senior political scientist at The RAND Corporation, rightly  
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observed that “For the coastal communities, the pirates are the major economic 





II. Gulf of Guinea 
The poverty factor plays a big role in bringing about piracy in this region. Nigeria is 
a classic example of how poverty could lead to a deluge of piracy acts. It is granted 
that piracy has always existed in the region, but it was unimaginable a few years ago 
that the piracy in this region could attain its present alarming level. The current 
situation in Nigeria‟s Niger-Delta area which has led to armed gangs orchestrating 
pirate attacks off the coast of Nigeria (and who are largely responsible for most of 
the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea) originated from the oil exploration activities and 
the injustice meted out to those in that area by the government. The people of this 
area had the natural belief that the oil discovered and explored in their area would 
benefit their communities,
177
 the foreign multinational companies rather than train 
the locals with a view to employing them brought in expatriates and modern 
luxurious facilities and also surrounded themselves with armed guards to deter local 
trouble makers
178
 while the indigenes who were living in poverty could do nothing, 
but helplessly look on.  
 
This development, working in concert with the brazen corruption which has 
characterised the ruling elite in Nigeria, the oil pollution resulting from the oil 
exploration activit es which damaged the marine life from which the locals made a 
living and the fact that the people of the Niger-Delta were left to live in squalor, 
became the ultimate brew for chaos.“The contract between riches and abject poverty 
is as it has always been – a recipe for disaster”.
179
 The indigenes of the Niger-Delta 
area after decades of neglect and been denied of the joy and rewards of oil been 
explored in their „backyards‟ took to arms with their cause been championed by 
various armed militias and gangs and the resulting chaos is as we have it now. The 
present situation of piracy as we have it in the Gulf of Guinea and off the Nigerian 
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coast will not abate until these core issues of poverty and neglect of the inhabitants of 
the Niger-Delta in Nigeria are addressed since most of the piracy carried out in this 
axis are executed by the self proclaimed freedom fighters turned pirates emanating 
from this region. 
 
III. Southeast Asia 
The economic factors leading to a resort to piracy in Southeast Asia include 
“overfishing, pollution and the ensuing poverty of fishers and their families”.
180
 The 
development of new and sophisticated technologies brought about the construction of 
more advanced fishing vessels which led to increased catches and the capturing of 
stocks that had previously been beyond reach.
181
 However, this soon led to a decline 
in fishstocks in the region and especially affected were those fishers who didn‟t have 
vessels with the capability of going long distances to newer and more promising 
fishing grounds.
182
 Those of the fishermen who became desperate sought refuge in 
piracy as a source of income.
183
 Furthermore, these desperate fishermen became 





3.3.3 Ransom Payment 
The demand and payment of ransom is now a characteristic of modern day piracy 
and which is now a trademark of pirates operating in most areas of the world in 
which piracy is endemic. The pirates see it as the fastest and easiest way of reaping 
dividends once a hijacking becomes successful. There is no contesting the fact that 
the payment of ransoms is a consistent factor which fuels modern day piracy and is 
one of the core factors that emboldens and inspires pirates to carry out attacks.  The 
demand and payment of ransom has now given the menace of piracy a business-like 
face. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead commented that 
“the ransoms fuel the business; the business invests in more capability -- either in a 
bigger boat, more weapons, better electronic-detection means to determine where the 
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ships are, … So it‟s a business”.
185
 The extent to which ransom payment has fueled 
and continued to support piracy is better appreciated when one considers the fact that 
these ransom payments have become a core source of revenue in recent times
186
 and 
accordingly forms “part of Puntland‟s socioeconomic structure”.
187
 It is reported by 
the UN Monitoring Group in Somalia that money garnered from piracy and 
kidnapping have been received from core members of Puntland‟s government 





In Southeast Asia, from a historical perspective, piracy “was thought to be an 
acceptable part of the local culture, a normal but illegal means of making money”.
189
 
Piracy and ransom demand were seen in some areas as the only means of survival as 
agriculture and economic conditions were insufficient to sustain them.
190
 Thus the 
financial gains of ransom demands accruing from hijacking a ship are so great that 
any economic improvement is seen as insignificant in comparison to the massive 
gains of piracy.
191
 It would therefore be difficult to stop ransom demands or to 
abolish what has been regarded as a core aspect of local culture and a crucial sector 
of the
192
 “local economy of coastal communities in the littoral states in Southeast 
Asia”
193
 Ransom demands have skyrocketed from hundreds of thousands of dollars 




This situation is a confirmation that steps to stop payments of ransoms will definitely 
be met by resistance and reluctance in many quarters as it has now come to form a 
core part in the livelihoods of so many people in the piracy endemic areas in the 
world. The willingness of ship owners to make the ransom payment in order to 
guarantee the release and safety of their crew, vessel and cargo does nothing, but 
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exacerbate the piracy situation.
195
 However, can anyone really blame them? Most of 
the companies are disposed to making the ransom in order to secure the release of the 
crew, cargo and vessel and also to minimise the time spent by the ship idling away in 




There is no doubt that ransom payments will continue to fuel the scourge of piracy 
and only if it is curbed will piracy lose most its present appeal to pirates who see it as 
a money spinner in enriching themselves. A close look at the intrigues and legalities 
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4.  EFFECTS OF PIRACY ON THE MARINE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
The previous chapters have attempted  a definition of piracy, as well as analysis of 
the causes of piracy and where the menace is prevalent. An analysis of how the 
definition of piracy can affect the insurer-assured relationship in relation to the cover 
of piracy as a peril in the various marine insurance policies will be undertaken in this 
chapter. The analysis will also examine how the piracy endemic areas earlier 
examined have influenced events in the marine insurance industry. 
 
4.1 Historical Purview of Marine Insurance 
Marine insurance law has been described as the “mother of all insurance”.
197
 Around 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the practice evolved in northern Italy whereby 
certain merchants were willing to insure the risk of other merchants upon the 
payment of a premium
198
 and to indemnify “those who suffered loss as a 
consequence of specified perils”.
199
 Merchants were able to insure their business 
upon this arrangement. The collective premiums from all the merchants who paid 
premiums to insure their goods supplied the fund from which indemnities could be  
paid by the insurers
200
 and the premiums paid by the merchants was reflected in the 
price of goods sold to their customers. This insurance business soon extended its 
tentacles to Europe and became entrenched in England in what was referred to as 
Lombard Street, by virtue of a Royal Warrant of Henry IV.
201
 This insurance 
„wildfire‟ later extended itself to the American and English colonies.
202
 Most of the 
business was conducted in coffee houses and the most famous of which is now 
Lloyd‟s of London.
203
 It is pertinent to note that most of the practices initiated by 
Lloyd‟s of London have laid the foundation for most of the prevailing practices 
pervading the marine insurance industry today.  
 
4.2 Types of Marine Insurance Policies  
For the purposes of this essay, it is important to decipher the various categories of 
insurance policies available in present day marine insurance as this will be the core 
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areas which this chapter will revolve around in order to determine the extent to 
which the menace of piracy has affected the operational mechanisms of policies and 
coverage offered by the marine insurance industry.  
 
At the early stages of the 19
th
 Century, it was possible to delineate marine insurance 





 Century saw the evolution of marine insurance into three major parts: 
freight, hull and cargo, while protection and indemnity insurance (P&I) was more or 
less a footnote to hull insurance.
205
 However, the present day position is that P&I 
insurance is a core part of the marine insurance industry and as such the modern 
branches of marine insurance can be categorised into Cargo, Hull and P&I clubs.
206
 
Let us now take a brief look at these categories of marine insurance covers. 
 
I  Hull & Machinery Insurance 
The H & M insurance basically insures the shipowner against damage or loss to the 
ship caused by perils specified in the policy.
207
 The H & M policy also indemnifies 
the shipowner for all expenses he incurs in repairing or replacing the ship as a result 
of damage or destruction suffered by the ship caused by one of the perils specifically 
covered in the policy.
208
 It can be said that most marine insurance covers “are 
underwritten on standard insurance policies prepared by the marine insurance 
industries of the major underwriting nations”.
209
 The United States uses the 
American Institute clauses 1977, but amended in 2009. In England, the International 
Underwriting Association‟s (IUA) „Institute Clauses‟ or „IUA clauses‟ are used. It 
must be noted that while the Institute clauses are often entrenched into policies 
issued at Lloyds of London, the IUA operates quite separately from Lloyds of 
London.
210
  The perils covered by the institute clauses and International Hull clauses 
are basically categorised into the perils which do not require a want  of due diligence 
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 and the Inchmaree‟ cover which are perils insured only 




II Cargo Insurance 
Marine insurance cover is not only for the benefit of the shipowner and one party in a 
shipping contract who derives huge benefits from marine insurance is the cargo 
owner. Marine cargo insurance is basically concerned with the “physical loss or 
damage to the cargo, not financial losses or expenses.
213
 Marine cargo insurance not 
only covers physical loss and damage to the goods, but also acts as a cover for loss of 
the entire adventure when underwritten in the context of a voyage basis which is 
more often than not the usual case.
214
 This is because though the goods may still be 
undamaged, and in control and possession of the assured-cargo owner, but are unable 
to arrive at their destination because of loss of the adventure.
215
 A basic cargo policy 
encompasses a “three dimensional process”
216
 which includes the policy clauses 
defining the limitations of the coverage afforded to the assured, the duration of the 




III Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I Clubs) 
The Protection and indemnity insurance evolved in order to afford protection to 
shipowners for the liabilities not covered by the Hull insurance. The P&I insurance 
covers specifically third party liabilities of the shipowner. The necessity of the P&I 
clubs can be traced to the case of De Vaux v. Salvador
218
 which held that the Hull 
insurers who had traditionally been liable for the liability incurred by the shipowner 
in collision matters would no longer be liable to cover such liabilities. This was 
based on the court‟s opinion that the shipowners liability for collision damage 
towards a third party was not to be regarded a peril of the sea to be given cover by 
hull insurance.
219
 The fallout from this decision was that specific cover had to be 
procured by the shipowners and even then the hull insurers were only liable for three 
fourths of the collision liability while the shipowner was liable for the remaining one 
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fourth. Hare is of the opinion that the motive for the shipowner being liable for the 
remainder of one fourth is to ensure that a keen watch and lookout is maintained by 
the shipowners and their masters.
220
 This situation therefore led to the forming of the 
P&I clubs to provide adequate cover for the shipowners. However, it is important to 
note that there are divergent opinions as regards the influence of this decision. Mark 
Tilley asserts that the opinion that this decision influenced the development of 
Protection and indemnity insurance is incorrect in view of the research undertaken by 
the Insurance Institute of London.
221
 The institute reported that cover for liability for 
collision damages through shipowner‟s mutual underwriting associations had existed 
prior to the landmark decision.
222
 Be that as it may, the structure of present day P&I 
clubs demand that they be registered as corporate personalities for administrative and 
legal convenience.
223
 The importance of P&I clubs can be assessed by the 
consideration that over 90% of the world‟s merchant vessels are registered with one 
P&I club or the other.
224
 It is pertinent to bear in mind that P&I insurance is basically 
mutual and non profit and the P&I clubs are funded by the contributions made by 





4.3 Piracy and Marine Insurance 
Historically, the situation in England was that piracy has pendulated between being 
regarded as a marine risk and a war risk
226
. It was included in the old Lloyd‟s SG 
policy as an insured peril, but was later expunged by the “Free of Capture and 
Seizure Clause (FC&S)”.
227
 Thus it was imperative to get the Institute War and 
Strike cover if an assured sought to be insured for piracy. It could be said that the 
FC&S clause was a mechanism used by the insurers to restrict the perils to be 
insured, including piracy from the marine insurance policy in order to compel the 
shippers to pay more premiums in order to obtain war risk insurance.
228
 Another 
                                                          
220
 Hare (note 197) at 945. 
221
 M Tiley „The origin and development of the mutual shipowners Protection & Idemnity 
associations‟ (1986) 17 J.Mar.L&Com 261.  
222
 Tiley (note 221). 
223
 Hare (note 197) at 946. 
224
 Tiley (note 221) at 261. 
225
 Hare (note 197) at 949. 
226
 Rose (note 198) at 279. 
227
 Hodges (note 67) at 212. 
228
 CM Douse „Combating  risk on the high sea: an analysis of the effects of modern piratical acts on 
















advantage derived by the exclusion of piracy by the FC&S clause was that the 
insurer was relieved from paying the expenses under the „Sue and Labour‟ clause 
which were incurred by the assured by paying ransom to the pirates in order to avoid 
the loss of the vessel.
229
 However, piracy has now swung back to be included as an 
insured peril in the standard clauses for Institute Hulls and Freight policies which 
stipulate expressly that it is not a subject of exclusion by the war exclusion clause.
230
 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that since 2005, there is now the availability of 
alternative wording to transfer piracy as marine peril to the war risk policy in the 




As regards cargo insurance, piracy was initially treated as a “marine or, 
subsequently, all risks perils”.
232
 This was the situation until the Institute Clauses 
were reviewed in 1937 as a result of the Spanish War which had the effect of 
transforming piracy into a war risk peril.
233
 Piracy swung back again in 1982 to 
become an all risk peril. Therefore, it is excluded from the war exclusion clause of 
the Institute Cargo Clauses A, but neither the Institute Cargo Clauses (B) and (C) 
declares it to be an insured peril nor as a peril excluded by the war exclusion clause. 
It therefore means that piracy must be specifically insured in cases where the 




4.4 Piracy and its Impact on Marine Insurance Policies 
We have seen the various definitions of piracy and their shortcomings. There is no 
doubt that piracy, its definition, and how it is seen by the marine insurance industry 
affects the policies covering the marine adventures of the assured (shipowner and 
cargo owner). The relationship of the insurer and the assured is based upon the policy 
issued by the marine insurers and it therefore becomes pertinent to see how piracy is 
covered by the various policies and how the relationship of the insurer and the 
assured is affected by the intrigues of the concept of piracy and its coverage under 
these policies. 
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4.4.1 Piracy and its effects on Hull & Machinery Insurance 
In England, the principal marine insurance clauses under the Institute Clauses are the 
Institute Voyage Clauses Hulls (IVCH) 83 &95, Institute Time Clauses  Hulls 
(ITCH) 83 & 95, and the  International Hull Clauses(IHC), 2003. It appears that the 
1983 clauses are still the more commonly preferred. It has been stated earlier that 
piracy is a covered risk under the Institute Hull Clauses. It is covered as a marine 
peril under IVCH 83 & 95, cl.4.1.5; ITCH 83& 95, cl.6.1.5; IHC 03, cl.2.1.5. Now, 
the inquiry is this, what is the effect of the concept of piracy and its intrigues on Hull 
and Machinery Insurance? But first, a reflection on how the definition of piracy has 
affected the marine insurance contract between the insurer and the assured. 
   
It is imperative from the onset to bear in mind that none of the clauses referred to 
above provide a definition of what piracy is. Therefore, this automatically means that 
the previous definitions of piracy with specific regard to the case law definition 
relied upon in the marine insurance sector analysed earlier is what will guide the 
parties in a marine insurance contract. The fact that any definition of piracy is flawed 
with so many shortcomings poses a great problem to the shipowner. The case of 
Republic of Bolivia v Indemnity Mutual Assurance Co Ltd
235
 has established that an 
attack on a ship would not amount to piracy if it was not carried out for private ends. 
The fallout from this decision is that a piratical attack upon the ship of the assured 
which is termed as an attack by insurgents or politically motivated criminals would 
not amount to an act of piracy. Thus any attack on a ship under these circumstances 
would be excluded by IVCH 83,cl.21.2; ITCH 83,cl.24.2; IVCH 95,cl.22.2 ; ITCH 
95,cl.25.2 and IHC,cl.30.2, all of which contain „strike exclusion clauses‟ excluding 
liability for any loss, expenses or damage arising from acts of persons with political 
motivation. The implication is that the assured suddenly becomes uninsured as he 
would not be within the ambits of the definition of piracy as laid down by this case 
and the insurer becomes freed from the liability of indemnifying the assured.  
 
It is also believed that an act of piracy could be both encompassed and beclouded by 
the excluded peril of „riots‟ if the required elements are satisfied.
236
 Riot is excluded 
by ITCH 83,cl.24.1; IVCH 83,cl.21.1; ITCH 95,cl.25.1; IVCH 95,cl.22.1 and 
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ICH.cl.29.4. It is also defined by S1(1) of the English Public Order Act 1986 as 
follows: 
“Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten 
unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken 
together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at 
the scene to fear for his personal safety, each of the persons using unlawful 
violence for the common purpose is guilty of riot.” 
  
Another problem could arise in circumstances where pirates maliciously decide to 
damage or destroy a ship in cases where their demands have not been met. Pirates do 
not have the primary intention of destroying any ship, which they have hijacked as 
such a vessel is a prized asset, which they would normally protect in order to achieve 
their objective of obtaining a ransom payment.
237
 However, they might not hesitate 
to do so where their demands have been refused and in doing so may care less if such 
act causes colossal damage. Gotthard Gauchi is of the opinion that such an incident 
would take the hijacking of the ship out of its piratical nature and could be regarded 
as “use of any weapon or the detonation of an explosive by any person acting 
maliciously”
238
 which is excluded under IVCH 83,cl.22; ITCH 83,cl.26; IVCH 
95,cl.23; ITCH 95,cl.23 and IHC,cl.30.3. The consequential effect of this is that the 
assured-shipowner is unable to be indemnified by the insurer, as he would have lost 
his cover for piracy.  
 
4.4.1.1 Ransom Payments and its effects on Hull insurance  
The concept of piracy and ransom payments which go hand in hand have a number 
of effects on hull insurance. The hijacking of ships in present day piracy is for the 
primary aim of ransom demand as can be seen in the patterns displayed by the pirates 
of Somalia which presents a faster and quicker way of making money rather than the 
arduous and lengthy stress of trying to sell the ship. The effects of ransom payment 
on hull insurance will be considered in light of the consequential issues which flows 
from the payment of ransom which will be appraised by considering the decision  in 
The Bunga Maleti Dua
239
 in relation to the legality of ransom payments, the 
possibility of recovering such ransom payments by the assured from the insurer and 
the consequences of the assured‟s refusal to pay ransom to seek release of the ship. 
These issues will be discussed below. 
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I  The Bunga Melati Dua and the legality of ransom payments. 
The marine insurance industry and shipowners have faced continued harsh criticism 
for indulging in the payments of ransoms, despite the fact that the payments of these 
ransom demands presently appear to be the only guaranteed way of ensuring that 
lives are not lost and that the ship and cargo are preserved from destruction. These 
criticisms largely stem from a moral angle and are reinforced by the fact that the 
ransom payments have fuelled the endless appetite of the pirates for more money. 
However, whatever moral justification that has been adduced against the payments of 
ransom appears to have been displaced by the recent decision of the Court of Appeal 
in the landmark case of The Bunga Melati Dua.
240
 One of the crucial issues 
determined in the case bordered on whether ransom payment contravened public 
policy.  
 
The Bunga Melati Dua was a ship which had been laden with a cargo of biodiesel 
and was heading for Rotterdam, when it was unfortunately hijacked by Somali 
pirates and taken into Somali coastal waters. The owners of the cargo immediately 
commenced negotiations for the ransom payment in order to secure the release of the 
ship and while this was ongoing, the cargo owners served a notice of abandonment 
on its insurers declaring the cargo to be an actual total loss. This was rejected by the 
insurers on the ground that the cargo was not irretrievably lost and could be 
recovered by the payment of the ransom demand which they contended was neither 
illegal nor against public policy. The argument of the insurers was upheld in the 
court a quo, and on appeal, the Court of Appeal held that “it is to be observed that 
there is no legislation against payment of ransom, which is therefore not illegal
”241
 
and that the repeal of the Ransom Act 1782 in 1864 served to emphasise this 
position.
242
 The court further held that “the fact that there may be no duty to make a 
ransom payment does not mean that there is any obligation not to make such a 
payment”.
243
 The effect of this decision is that presently, the payment of ransom is 
not illegal as far as English law is concerned. Therefore, the assured can engage in 
negotiations over the payment of any ransom demand without the fear of any legal 
sanctions. And as far as marine insurance is concerned, many marine policies are 
contractually subjected to English law. 
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However, the ransom payment becomes illegal “if the pirates are not such within a 
strict definition of that term but rather terrorists”
244
 in view of Section 15(3) of the 
English Terrorism Act 2000 which provides that an offence is committed by anyone 
who provides money or property for the purposes of terrorism with reasonable cause 
to believe that it may be used for such cause.  
 
Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that the position as to the legality of ransom 
payments differs from one jurisdiction to the other. Thus in the United States an 
Executive Order issued on 13
th
 April 2010 by President Obama recently made 
ransom paid in certain circumstances to pirates illegal and an offence. S1(i) of the 
Executive Order provides that “the making of any contribution or provision of funds, 
goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and 
interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order”. This Order makes it an 
offence to make payments to pirates which would subsequently get into the hands of 
certain designated persons and groups referred to that in that Order as particular 
threats to the security of the US. It is reported that this Order was issued because of 
American Intelligence “linking the Somali insurgence group Al-Shabaab to the 
terrorist group Al Qaeda, and the concern that any payments made to this entity, or 
the individuals identified in connection with the Executive Order, would contribute 
to the growing threat of terrorist activity in Somalia and elsewhere. Presently, there 
are eleven individuals as well as the terrorist group- Al-Shabaab who are identified in 
the annex to the Executive Order as being blocked and two of these individuals 
regarded as self identified pirates.
245
 The effect of this order is that ransom payment 
is prohibited and becomes illegal if made to a person who has been recognised and 
regarded as being blocked.
246
 Therefore, it could be said that ransom payments under 
the law of the US would not be illegal as long as it is not made to persons identified 
in the Annex to the Executive Order.  
 
It is not certain that the outlawing of ransom payment will bring any meaningful end 
to the relentless piratical attacks on ships. In view of the absence of any “overall 
strategic resolution, military or otherwise”
247
 to counter the menace of piracy, the 
only way out for the helpless shipowner will continue to be the payment of ransom. 
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The outlawing of ransom payment without resolving the problem of piracy will do 




II Ransom payment recovery under sue and labour and general average 
The second issue is whether the assured can recover a ransom payment from its 
insurers. In view of the fact that ransom payment is not illegal in England, it would 
imply that the assured would be able to recover expenses for ransom payment from 
its insurer. The ransom payment may be recoverable as expenses under general 
average or expenses under sue and labour.
249
 Let us now look at the possibility of the 
assured–shipowner recovering these expenses. 
 
In respect of the recovery under the sue and labour clause, it must be noted that the 
assured has an obligation to avert or reduce loss even where the insurance policy 
fails to contain a sue and labour clause.
250
 This obligation is provided for under s78 
(4) of MIA 1906 which provides that “it is the duty of the assured and his agents, in 
all cases, to take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or 
minimizing a loss”. Therefore the refusal of the assured to make the ransom payment 
may amount to a breach of the obligation to mitigate the loss referred to in s78 (4) of 
MIA 1906.
251
 The assured‟s recovery of the expenses undertaken by him or her is 
provided for under s78 (1) of MIA 1906 which provides that “Where the policy 
contains a suing and labouring clause, the engagement thereby entered into is 
deemed to be supplementary to the contract of insurance, and the assured may 
recover from the insurer any expenses properly incurred pursuant to the 
clause….”.
252
 The issue of the recovery of ransom payment under the sue and labour 
clause was considered in the case of Royal Boskalis v. Mountain
253
 where the court 
stated that ”unless the payment of ransom is illegal, it is recoverable from 
underwriters and, although the precise basis for the recovery is not altogether clear, it 
does seem to be accepted that it can be under sue and labour clause”.
254
 In 
buttressing this point, the court made further reference to an excerpt from Arnuold‟s 
Law of Marine Insurance and Average at p.791 at para.913A where it was stated 
that: 
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“Where the assured is forcibly deprived of possession or control of the 
insured property, it generally makes no difference whether those who deprive 
him of it are acting lawfully or unlawfully, as the perils covered by the 
standard policies are in most cases not subject to any limitation in this 
respect. Problems may, however, arise over the suing and labouring clause, 
where the steps the assured has taken (or which it is said he ought to have 
taken) are of an illicit nature. No difficulty arises where the payment of 
ransom or similar demands is illegal under the proper law of the policy, or 
the law of the forum where the claim is brought. In such cases, it is plain that 
the assured cannot recover under the suing and labouring clause . . . . There 
appears to be little doubt that where a payment which is not itself illegal 
under any relevant law is made to secure the release of property, this can be 
recovered even though the persons demanding the  
payment are not acting lawfully in so doing Thus, for example, payment to 





The recovery of ransom payment via the sue and labour clause was also considered 
in the recent case of The Bunga Maleti Dua
256
 where the court stated that the 
payment of a ransom could be recovered as sue and labour expenses.
257
 It can 
therefore be said that the assured‟s recovery of its ransom payments from the insurer 
will be possible as long as the payment of ransom is not illegal under the law 
applicable to the policy, which in most cases is English law. 
 
In respect of recovery of ransom payments as expenses under General Average, there 
is no doubt that the shipowner and the cargo owner both have enormous stakes in the 
safety of the marine adventure. In spite of the fact that it is the shipowner that makes 
the ransom payment, the shipowner can recover part of the payment from the cargo 
owner by way of general average. The assured is indemnified by the hull insurance 
against general losses and salvage charges which arise from any of the perils 
covered.
258
 It is important to note that from a historical view, ransom payment in 
general average has been admissible from a long time ago, dating back to Roman 
times.
259
 In respect of case law, it would appear that the courts have long recognised 
that ransom payment can be recovered by way of general contribution as far back as 
the 16
th
 century. Thus in the case of Hicks v. Palington
260
 it was decided that cargo 
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which had been given to pirates as ransom amounted to a sacrifice which was subject 




This principle is embedded in s66(4) of MIA 1906 which provides that the shipowner 
as regards general average expenses can “…recover from the insurer in respect of the 
proportion of the loss which falls upon him; and, in the case of a general average 
sacrifice, he may recover from the insurer in respect of the whole loss without having 
enforced his right of contribution from the other parties liable to contribute”.  
Therefore, this means that the insurer after indemnifying the assured for general 
average expenses can then move by way of subrogation against those liable to make 
contribution such as the cargo owner. 
 
The York-Antwerp Rules 2004 provides the criteria to be met in order to determine if 
an expenditure such as a ransom payment can be considered to be an act which falls 
under general average. In defining General Average the Rules state that “there is a 
general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure 
is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the 
purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime 
adventure”.
262
 A similar provision is also to be found in s66(2) of MIA 1906 which 
provides that “there is a general average act where any extraordinary sacrifice or 
expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in time of peril for the 
purpose of preserving the property imperiled in the common adventure”.
263
 It is 
pertinent to note that Rule A of the York Antwerp Rules is closely modeled on the 
MIA definition
264
 and a logical conclusion to be arrived at from the two definitions is 
that there are five essential features to be satisfied 
265
 for an expenditure to be 
considered a general average act which are that the act must be a peril; reasonably 
made; an extraordinary expenditure; for common benefit (common maritime 
adventure) and voluntary (intentional). 
 
In satisfying these key features, the following can be seen. Firstly, there is no doubt 
that the attack by pirates which constitutes the act of piracy is a peril covered by the 
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hull insurance. Secondly, the ransom payments made by the assured cannot be said to 
be reasonably contemplated by the assured in the course of the marine adventure
266
 
and as such will be considered extraordinary.  Thirdly, the ransom payment is 
voluntary as there is no statutory obligation or pre-existing contractual duty to make 
such payment.
267
 Fourthly, the ransom payment is for common benefit as it 
guarantees the release of the hijacked vessel in order to achieve completion of the 
marine adventure.
268
 Lastly, the payment of ransom which presently appears to be 
the only avenue to guarantee the safety of the ship, crew and the cargo can be said to 
be payment reasonably made. The conclusion could therefore be safely reached that 
ransom payment could be recovered by way of general average if these five features 
are present.  
 
However, it is pertinent to note that the recovery of ransom payments may not be 
possible under general average in some circumstances. Thus it might not be possible 
to enforce contribution towards general average where ransom payment is illegal in 
the jurisdiction of the parties to the maritime adventure.
269
 Similarly, difficulty to 
recover the ransom payments as a general average act may also arise where the 
pirates are termed as terrorists under the instances earlier referred to. 
 
III Effects of failure to pay ransom 
In the event that the assured fails to make the ransom payment either because he 
refuses to pay the ransom or because the ransom negotiations break down, then the 
question becomes relevant as to whether the assured will be able to recover any 
indemnification from the hull insurer in the event of the ship been destroyed or 
damaged by the pirates by way of retaliation. It has been stated earlier that s78(4) of 
MIA 1906 provides that “it is the duty of the assured and his agents, in all cases, to 
take such measures as may be reasonable for the purpose of averting or minimising a 
loss”. In the light of this provision, it would appear that the assured if it fails to 
mitigate the loss by paying the ransom would be violating the provisions of the MIA.  
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However, this suggestion was rejected in the case of The Netherlands v Youell and 
Hayward
270
. Here the Dutch royal navy had entered into a contract with a Dutch 
shipyard for the building of two submarines which had been insured with Lloyd‟s 
underwriters and with the shipyard also party to the insurance contract as a co–
assured. The submarines suffered damage to their paintwork and following the 
failure of the shipyard to make the necessary repairs, the repairs were paid for by the 
navy which were sought to be recovered from the insurers by way of 
indemnification. In a claim brought by the State of the Netherlands, the insurers 
denied liability on the grounds of s55(2)(a) and s78(4) of the MIA. The insurers 
contended that the refusal of the shipyard as a co-assured to make the repairs 
amounted to a failure to sue and labour which was a breach of S78(4) of the MIA and 
as such the refusal to indemnify the navy was justified. However, the court rejected 
this argument and held that there was no reason “…why cover which protects an 
assured against the errors and defaults of others, including servants, agents and other 
co-assureds, should be excluded by any principle that lies behind the statutory duty 
to avert or minimise loss”.
271
 In view of this decision, it could therefore be said that 
loss incurred by the assured-shipowner as a result of damage or destruction of the 
ship and arising from the failure to pay the ransom demand would not deny him of 
the right to be indemnified by the insurer. 
 
4.4.2 Piracy and its effects on Cargo Insurance 
In England, marine cargo insurance is basically covered by the Institute cargo clauses 
which are the Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) A, Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) B, 
Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) C. Let us now see the effect of piracy on these policies 
and how piracy has affected the ability of the assured to insure himself under the 
policies. 
 
The ICC(A) is projected as an „All risks‟ policy which in its literal meaning would 
perhaps be understood to mean that the policy covers all kinds and manners of 
marine perils that could be encountered by the cargo during a marine adventure. 
However, this is far from the true position as the ICC (A) does not cover every peril 
that may be the lot of the cargo during the marine adventure and is as a result subject 
to quite a number of implied limitations which restricts the cover to certain losses 
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arising from an accident.
272
 The 1982 and 2009 ICC (A) both cover all perils which 
may befall the cargo during the marine adventure except those excluded by Clauses 
4, 5 ,6, and 7.
273
 The peril of „war risk‟ is excluded by both 1982 ICC (A) and the 
2009 ICC (A) in Clause 6, but piracy is specifically excepted by the two types of ICC 
(A) from the war risk clause by Clause 6.2 which states that “capture seizure arrest 





The implication of this is that piracy is indeed covered as a marine peril and the 
cargo owner who takes out the ICC (A) will be covered in a case where the peril of 
piracy befalls the cargo covered by the policy. However, in a situation quite similar 
to the one analysed in the hull insurance, the fact that piracy is covered under the 
ICC (A) does not necessarily mean that the assured-cargo owner is ultimately 
covered. This is because where the pirates have been termed as „terrorists‟, this will 
take the piratical act out of the definition of piracy (earlier analysed) which then 
automatically implies that the assured becomes exposed because Clause 7.3 of the 
two types of ICC (A) exclude acts of terrorists or any act of terrorism from coverage 
under the two policies. Secondly, in the event that the pirates are termed as persons 
acting with political or religious motive, the cover will similarly be ousted by the 
definition of piracy and the assured will consequently become uninsured as Clause 
7.3 of the 1982 ICC (A) and Clause 7.4 of the 2009 ICC (A) exclude such acts. 
 
The situation is quite different under the ICC (B) and (C). The ICC (B) and (C) only 
cover named perils and is therefore a narrower form of cover.
275
 The peril of piracy 
is not covered under these two cargo clauses and so the effect of this on the insurer 
who takes the ICC (B) and (C) is that he or she would be exposed in the event that 
the cargo becomes captured by pirates. 
 
In the United States, the American Institute Cargo Clauses (AICC) are the principal 
policies which are widely used. The various categories of the current AICC are the 
American Institute Cargo Clauses 2004 Free of Particular Average – American 
Conditions (FPAAC) and American Institute Cargo Clauses 2004 Free of Particular 
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Average – English Conditions (FPAEC). A common feature in these policies is the 
FC&S Warranty clause which excludes war risks as well as the peril of piracy from 
coverage under the policies. This position is very much different from the situation in 
England whereby piracy is a covered peril under the ICC (A). Therefore, the way out 
for the assured in the United States who wishes to be insured against the risk of 
piracy is to procure war risk insurance coverage under the American Institute of 
Marine Underwriters (AIMU) War Risks Open Policy (Cargo) 1981 and 1993, both 
of which cover the risk of piracy.  
 
4.4.2.1 Piracy, General Average and Cargo Insurance . 
In the event that ransom payment is to be made in order to secure the release of the 
ship and the cargo, then the cargo owner may be required to contribute to the 
payment by way of general average. It has been earlier stated that the shipowner and 
the cargo owner both have a joint interest in the safety and the release of the ship and 
cargo. The ICC (A) (B) and (C) all cover general average in Clause 2 of the three 
categories of Cargo Clauses. There is no contest as far as the ICC (A) is concerned, 
the risk of piracy is covered under the „all risks‟ policy and as such any ransom 
payment will be contributed to by the cargo owner and which will be indemnified by 
the cargo insurer by way of general average. This is covered by s66(4) of the MIA 
1906 which had earlier on been referred to. However, in the case of the ICC (B) and 
(C), it would appear that the recovery of any contribution made by the cargo owner 
towards the ransom payment from the insurer would be unlikely in consideration of 
the fact that the peril or piracy is not covered under these clauses. 
 
4.4.2.2 Effects of the Cargo Piracy Notice of Cancellation 
As a result of the deluge of piracy claims due to the upsurge of pirate attacks in the 
Gulf of Aden and other piracy endemic areas, a „Cargo Piracy Notice of 






















“Where this insurance covers piracy and/or general average, salvage and 
sue and labour charges arising from piracy, such cover may be cancelled by 
insurers giving 7 days notice in writing, cancellation to take effect on the 
expiry of 7 days (10 days in respect of reinsurance) from midnight of the day 
on which the notice is issued by insurers. Insurers agree to reinstate this 
coverage subject to agreement between insurers and the insured prior to the 
cancellation taking effect as to any new rate of premium and/or conditions 
and/or warranties. Such cancellation shall not affect any insurance, which 
has attached before the cancellation takes effect. If the cancellation is in 
relation to specific geographical areas, such areas will be clearly defined by 
insurers in the notice of cancellation”. 
 
The main aim of the clause is to give the insurers the power to issue a notice of 
cancellation as regards the piracy risk during the tenure of the policy with the view of 
renegotiating a premium which is commensurate with the risk.
276
 Dunt is of the view 
that the necessity of the cancellation clause arises from the fact that piracy cover is a 
marine, or all risks, cover which has no provision for the cancellation of the policy 
unlike the general position in the war risks cover.
277
 The implication of this is that 
the assured might suddenly become exposed in the event that the cover is cancelled 
while the ship is in transit and the subject matter of the cargo insurance policy 
thereafter becomes hijacked by the pirates before the assured and the insurer can 
enter into a new agreement to renegotiate new premiums. 
 
4.4.3 Piracy and its effects on Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I) 
The formality of the operations of P&I clubs though in a way similar to other mutual 
insurers actually differs in certain ways.
278
 Policies are not usually issued by the 
clubs and the coverage offered to the members(assured) of the club are therefore 
detailed in the Rules of the associations.
279
 Each P&I club uses its own Rules to set 
the ambits of its cover.
280
 The Rules of most of the P&I clubs have similar provisions 
and the Rules of the North of England Protecting and Indemnity Association Limited 
(NEP&I) and Rules of the American Club Mutual P&I Association will be 
considered in relation to the effects of piracy on P&I insurance.   
 
It has been stated earlier that P&I insurance only covers third party liabilities of the 
shipowner, thus it is important from the onset to state that the P&I clubs do not cover 
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piracy as a named risk, but will only “cover liabilities which are set out in a „risk 
covered‟ rule”.
281
 In view of this, it is imperative to inquire if the possible liabilities 
ensuing from piracy as a peril are covered by protection and indemnity insurance. 
Rule 24(1) of the Rules of NE P&I club states that the club will not indemnify the 
shipowner from liabilities arising from war risks, but piracy and barratry are 
excepted. Similarly Rule 3, section 1 of the Rules of the American Club also makes 
analogous provisions which exclude liabilities arising from war risks, but also 
excepting piracy and barratry. Therefore, it means that third party liabilities which 
flow from an act of piracy are covered by the P&I clubs.  
In order to analyse the effects which piracy has on this important branch of the 
marine insurance industry, it is imperative to know which specific third party 
liabilities  piracy may give rise to and how P&I insurance covers such liabilities. The 
third party liabilities which would flow from a piratical attack would arise in relation 
to the crew and the vessel itself. In respect of crewmen, there is the high possibility 
of the pirates bringing harm upon the crew in their bid to hijack the ship.  The P&I 
insurance in this case would have to take care of the liabilities arising from the 
possible death, illness, injury, hospitalisation and repatriation of the crew members in 
any event (whether or not the crewmen put up a resistance to thwart the hijack of the 
ship). In view of this possible eventuality, cover is provided by Rule 19(1) of the 
Rules of NE P&I club for the liabilities relating to the death, injuries, illness or 
hospitalization of the seamen, while the same liabilities are similarly covered in Rule 
2 section 1 of the Rules of the American Club Mutual P&I Association.  
 
As regards cargo, in the possible though unlikely scenario that the pirates have their 
demands turned down which might instigate them into damaging or destroying the 
vessel which might be laden with oil or chemicals and thereby leading to the loss of 
the cargo, the P&I insurance would have to deal with the cargo claims from the cargo 
insurer who would have indemnified the cargo owner. Such cargo claim is covered 
by Rule 19(17) of the Rules of NE P&I club, while similar coverage is offered under 
Rule 2 section 8 of the Rules of the American Club Mutual P&I Association. In view 
of the pollution which would definitely arise from the destruction and spilling of the 
oil cargo, the inevitable pollution claims which would arise from such occurrence are 
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covered by Rule 19(13) of the Rules of NE P&I club and are similarly covered in 
Rule 2 section 13 of the Rules of the American Club Mutual P&I Association.  
 
4.4.3.1 Piracy, General Average and Protection and Indemnity Insurance 
It has been stated that P&I insurance will cover the shipowner only where it has 
incurred a legal liability. Therefore where there is want of legal liability, the P&I 
clubs have clearly maintained the position that they shall not cover ransom 
payment.
282
 This position stems from the understanding that, though there might be a 
moral obligation for the shipowner to pay ransom in order to seek the release of the 
crew and the ship, there might not  exist any legal obligation to do so.
283
 However, 
there have been arguments that there should be a contribution via general average 
from Protection and Indemnity Insurance in relation to ransom payments.
284
 The 
crew of the ship and the ship itself are two of the beneficiaries of the ransom 
payment and since by the provisions of S66(2) of the MIA 1906 and the criteria laid 
down by the York Antwerp Rules 2004 both of which have been analysed earlier, 
ransom payment would qualify for general average contribution from both the cargo 
insurer and hull insurer, it would be arguable that the P&I clubs which cover the 
shipowners liabilities as regards crew injuries and pollution damage may be exposed 
to claims from the shipowners, cargo owners and other interests
285
 in view of the fact 
that the crew could have come to serious harm and that the ship may have been 
destroyed. However, the P&I clubs have argued that general average is apportioned 
to property interests and involves the threat to life and threat to the safety of the 
ship.
286
 It has further been argued that ransom payment should be seen as an expense 
and not as liability, therefore not requiring contribution from the P&I clubs. 
 
4.4.4 Piracy and its effects on War Risks Insurance 
It has been stated earlier that in England, piracy wavered between been covered as a 
peril under marine risk to war risk and is presently been covered as a peril in hull 
insurance under the ITCH 83 & 95, ITVH83 & 95 and IHC 2003. In relation to 
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cargo, it is covered as a peril under the ICC (A), but not under the ICC (B) & (C). In 
2005, optional clauses were introduced by the Joint Hull Committee (after 
consultation with the Joint War committee) which excluded piracy from coverage 
under hull policies with the intent of transferring it back to the war risk cover, but 
most underwriters chose not to adopt the additional clause and instead left it to 




However, the murderous upsurge in the attacks by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden 
and other endemic areas has now seen marine insurance underwriters in London 
begin a” large-scale transition from covering piracy under hull policies to covering 
the peril under war risk policies”.
288
 It has been suggested that “in London now in 
about 80% of cases, (piracy is) being transferred from the hull to the war policy”.
289
 
The insurance underwriters in London have now begun to incorporate the Violent 
Theft, Piracy and Barratry Exclusion Clause into the various categories of hull 
insurance (ITCH 83 & 95, IVCH 83 & 95, and the ICH 2003) which has the effect of 
expressly excluding the perils of violent theft by persons from outside the vessel; 
piracy; and barratry from all categories of hull insurances. The implication of this is 
that shipowners who require cover for piracy have to seek such cover under the 
Institute War and Strikes Clauses Hulls (IWSCH) which had previously lacked cover 
for piracy, barratry nor violent theft, but has now been amended by the Violent Theft, 
Piracy and Barratry Extension Clause since 2005.  
 
The IWSCH has now seen the incorporation of three new clauses after clause 1.6 
which are clause 1.7(violent theft by persons from outside the Vessel); clause 
1.8(piracy); clause 1.9(barratry of Master Officers or Crew). This recent 
development of incorporating piracy into the IWSCH would therefore appear to have 
provided a panacea to the ambiguities regarding the issue of definition of acts of 
piracy being clouded by other perils such as „riots‟ and „malicious damage‟ which 
are not covered under hulls insurance, but are adequately covered under the IWSCH. 
 
It is interesting to note that the assured may not be totally covered against the peril of 
piracy under the IWSCH as the assured may be faced with the hurdle presented by 
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the  Navigation Limitations for Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils 
Endorsement which provides that the insured vessel shall not sail or enter into the 
territorial waters of any of the countries or places whose names are published 
periodically by the Joint War Committee in the current List of Areas of Perceived 
Enhanced Risk (Listed Areas).
290
 The waters of the Indian Ocean, Arabian Gulf, Gulf 
of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Southern Red Sea and the African countries of Nigeria, 
Somalia and Libya as well as some countries in the Middle East perceived as „high 
risk‟ have all featured prominently in the List of Areas which were published in 
2011. The implication of this is that any insured ship which ventures into any of 
these listed zones will become uninsured and will not be indemnified by the insurer 
unless due notice about the breach is brought to the insurer‟s attention as soon as it is 
possible and amended terms of the cover and additional premiums required by the 




In relation to cargo insurance, it has been stated earlier that piracy is only covered 
under ICC (A), and it therefore becomes imperative for the assured who wishes to 
insure his cargo against piracy to procure the ICC (A) as against procuring the ICC 
(B) or (C) which will not insure him against the risk of piracy since the peril is not 
covered in these categories of cargo insurance.  
 
In the United States, it is important to note that piracy has always been an excluded 
peril under the American Institute Hull Clauses (AIHC) 1977 and still remains 
excluded in the amended AHIC 2009. Thus the implication of this is that an assured 
who wishes to be insured for piracy must seek coverage under war risk insurance 
which is a covered peril under the American Institute Hull War Risks and Strikes 
Clauses (AIHWRSC) 1977 and is also covered as a peril under the amended 
AIHWRSC 2009. 
 
4.4.5 Piracy and its effects on Kidnap and Ransom Insurance. 
The fact that ransom payments may be recoverable under the sue and labour clause 
and general average has been analysed earlier. However, it is a reality that the 
recovery of the ransom payment made by the assured could be a subject of dispute 
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and in order to avoid such murky waters, there has been a resort to Kidnap and 
Ransom insurance (K & R Insurance) which provides a guarantee that the ransom 
payment will be taken care of by the insurer based upon the payment of adequate 
premium for that cause. The intrigues associated with the payment of ransom by the 
shipowner are more often than not time consuming, energy sapping and require 
considerable financial muscle to meet the ransom demands of the pirates. The 
shipowner might be confronted with issues of how to approach the pirates; how to 
initiate and conduct the negotiation process; how to raise the required capital to meet 
the ransom payment and the rather complex process of delivering the ransom. K & R 
insurance is specifically designed to assist the shipowner in dealing with these 
cumbersome issues.
292
 It ensures that priority treatment is given to the shipowner by 
kidnap negotiators.
293
 Lloyd‟s of London was the first insurer to offer K&R 
insurance, but today, there are quite a number of insurers who offer this type of 
insurance.
294
 What is covered under the K&R insurance is reliant upon the wordings 
used in the policy.
295
 Thus the coverage offered by K&R insurers actually differs 
from one policy to the other which is usually worded in order to accommodate the 
needs of the assured. 
 
The persons covered under the K&R insurance policy would include the ships crew 
ships agents, supernumeraries, and persons legally on board the vessel during the 
occurrence of the piracy incident.
296
 The benefits derived from a marine K&R 
insurance would include having immediate access to professional ransom negotiators 
and skilled security experts to provide guidance for the insured throughout the 
kidnap and ransom situation
297
 and ensuring that the kidnap and ransom costs are met 
subject to the limitations on the policy.
298
 The policy would also cover the 
indemnification of the assured in situations whereby the ransom becomes the subject 
of theft or loss during its transit to the pirates.  
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5. PREVENTIVE AND COUNTERMEASURES TO COMBAT PIRACY 
We have seen the various challenges and effects which piracy poses to the shipping 
industry and most especially the assured (shipowner and cargo owner) and the 
insurer who represent the core players in the marine insurance industry. We have 
also seen how the definition of piracy could suddenly render the assured to become 
uninsured if a piratical attack does not fall within the ambits of the definitional 
constraints of piracy alongside the recent stance been taken by the marine insurance 
underwriters in reaction to the upsurge in the level of piratical attacks. Therefore, it 
behoves the shipowner to try as much as possible to deter the occurrence of a 
piratical attack on his ship as this would save him the consequential effects which 
flows from a successful pirate attack regardless of the fact that he may be insured. 
Prevention they say, is much better than cure. Various preventive innovations to 
deter and prevent the success of a pirate attack have now been developed and we 
shall take a look at some of these measures in countering piracy. 
 
5.1 Secure Ship 
The Secure Ship represents the most current and effective innovative countermeasure 
to prevent piracy
299
 and is designed to guard the ship against pirate attacks, 
stowaways and illegal entry into the ship. The innovation consists of a collapsible 
electrified fence which is made to surround the ship and which can be easily 
collapsed when the ship is entering harbour or when a boat has need to come 
alongside the ship.
300
 The electric fence is divided into starboard and port zones 
thereby making it possible to have one side of the ship activated while the other is 
deactivated which becomes quite useful when the vessel is moored alongside in the 
harbor.
301
 The secure ship has a sophisticated control system which can detect any 
attempt to enter the vessel and such attempts are transmitted to a number of output 
devices such as lights, sirens and alarms.
302
 A “very loud noise generating system 
and strong flood lights ensure that any boarding attempts are quickly aborted”
303
 
while a high voltage which is non lethal makes the vessel almost impregnable 
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thereby guaranteeing the crew and ship‟s protection.
304
 It must be noted that even in 
the event of power failure attempts to board the vessel will still be detected. The 
electrified wire system produces a voltage level of a maximum of 9000 volts which 




5.2 Ship Security Alert Systems (SSAS) 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in December 2002 adopted certain 
changes to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention at the SOLAS Conference 
which resulted in certain amendments to the convention in order to prevent unlawful 
attacks against ships.
306
 The amendments saw the incorporation of the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) into a new chapter XI of the 
convention and the Ship Security Alert systems was provided for in Regulation 6.
307
 
This Regulation demanded that a Ship Security Alert system must be provided for in 
all categories of ships, which are specified in the said regulation. The Ship Security 
Alert system has the effect of transmitting a “ship-to-shore security alert to a 
competent authority designated by the Administration”
308
 which shall pinpoint the 
ship‟s location and indicate that the ship‟s security has been compromised or is under 
threat.
309
 The SSAS shall also not raise any alarm on board the ship nor send the 
security alert to other ships and the alert shall continue until it has been 
deactivated.
310
 The IMO in addition to the amendments also produced guidance on 
the effective implementation of the SSAS
311
 as well as guidance for directing the 





The ShipLoc is one of the Ship Security Alert Systems that can be found in the 
market. It is an inexpensive satellite tracking system which enables shipping 
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companies to pinpoint the precise location of their ships via a computer which has 
internet access.
313
 The shipowners are able to permanently track their ships around 6 
to 24 times a day.
314
 Information regarding the ship such as its speed, heading, 
location as well as meteorological indicators such as air pressure, wind and waves 
are all visible on the ShipLoc website.
315
 In a crisis situation, an alert which is 
activated by pressing the panic button in the ship is sent from the ship to the shore 
which is not receivable by other ships around and the reports are immediately 
received by the shipowner, the IMB and the competent authority such as the flag 
state authority.
316
 The result is that a response such as a coast guard intervention 
force is scrambled to counter the imminent risk and attack. The shiploc is endorsed 





5.3 Long Range Acoustic Device 
In October 2000, an American warship-the USS Cole was attacked and a forty foot 
hole was blown into the side of the ship by suspected suicide bombers. As a result of 
this incident, the Long Range Acoustic Device was developed by the American 
Technology Corporation.
318
 The device can operate at a frequency of 120dB to serve 
as a warning to any approaching vessel or craft to alter its course and can be jerked 
up to 151dB which has the potential of emitting a very painful and loud noise in 
order to deter pirates.
319
 The technology of the acoustic device has now been drafted 
into another military device called the „Phraselator‟ which is designed to issue 
particular warnings and orders in different languages
320
 and if such orders are not 
obeyed, then a painful and loud warring sound follows.
321
 Its use has been employed 
by the police and US military to serve as warnings from as far as 300m away, but its 
use in quelling civil disturbances and uprisings have been condemned by human 
rights activists who argue that sound emissions which are higher than 90dB are 
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potentially harmful to hearing.
322
 Carl Gruenler, a (former) vice president of military 
and government operations for American Technology Corporation was reported as 
conceding that the device is capable of causing permanent hear damage and that it is 
only meant to be employed for a few seconds each time it is used
323
. The success of 
the device in deterring pirates has also come under criticism and it failed to prevent 
the attack of pirates on a Liberian flagged vessel in November 2008.
324
 There have 
also been concerns regarding its effectiveness as arguments have been raised that the 
device becomes harmless and defeated by the use of hearing protection such as 
earplugs. 
 
5.4 The Sea Laser (lasersec) 
The "SeaLase" laser was developed quite similarly to the one employed by the US 
military for crowd control in Afghanistan and Iraq and it has a range of four 
kilometers and the closer one gets to the laser makes it harder to look at
325
. 
According to the company which developed the device for commercial use- Lasersec 
Systems, attackers who come within one kilometer of the device have been reported 
to develop nausea and loss of sight.
326
 However, the loss of sight inflicted by the 
laser is only temporary and no permanent damage is reported. The use of the SeaLase 
has now become quite popular with superyacht owners who wish to protect their 
million dollar properties.
327
 As a result of the fact that the carriage of guns on board a 
ship even if it be for protection is not condoned in so many countries in the world, 
the use of the SeaLase which is a non-lethal weapon is highly favored by many yacht 
crews and vessel owners alike
328
. The Russian Billionaire-Roman Abramovich, has 
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6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This dissertation has taken a look at the definitional shortcomings of piracy which 
pose serious challenges to the fight and efforts in curtailing and curbing the hydra 
headed monster which it has become. We have also seen the root causes of piracy 
and how certain core factors aid in its germination and growth as well as the 
importance which the readiness, ability and willingness of the state plays in 
combating the menace of piracy. A look has also been taken at how piracy has posed 
various challenges to the marine insurance industry and how it has come to impact 
on the relationship between the assured and the insurer in respect of the various 
marine insurance policies forming the basis of the contractual relationship between 
the two parties. In view of the issues analysed in this essay, certain realities come to 
light which if not tackled will result into the fact that pirates will continue to have  
the upper hand in the efforts to combat the menace called piracy and which will 
continue to have ricocheting effects on the marine insurance industry. Let us now 
examine these variables. 
 
Firstly, there is a huge challenge posed by the lack of an international all 
encompassing definition to piracy. The stark reality of the situation is that as long as 
the shortcomings confronting the various definitions of piracy analysed in this essay 
continue to remain at large without the required steps taken to redress these 
loopholes, the various international efforts to combat piracy will continue to be 
remain shortsighted and will be akin to taking a „fire brigade‟ approach. There is an 
urgent need for the International community to redress the current ambiguities 
confronting the definition of piracy. The UNCLOS definition should be amended in 
order to provide an all embracing definition which would take into consideration not 
only the new intrigues posed by modern day piracy, but also the antics and modus 
operandi employed by present day pirates. This amended international definition 
should also be made applicable in every state by way of each state adopting and 
integrating this international definition into its municipal laws. By this way, any 
pirate apprehended by any state will not be able to escape prosecution by the default 
of an absence of a piracy law in such state. This much needed amendment to the 
present definition as we have it should also give a wide latitude to the various navies 
of the world to apprehend pirates in the territorial waters of third states so as to 
apprehend pirates who seek to escape by making use of this present loophole. Until 
















the waterways will remain futile as pirates who are not able to escape been 
apprehended by seeking refuge in the territorial waters of weak states which are 
incapable of patrolling their waters, will find succor in the ambiguities currently 
beclouding the present definition of piracy as we have it.  
 
In relation to the marine insurance sector, in view of the fact that most marine 
insurance policies are always governed by English law, it becomes paramount that 
there should be a revision of the MIA 1906 in order to provide a modern definition of 
piracy for the purposes of the marine insurance industry. In view of the shortcomings 
and deficiencies posed by a lack of modernised definition to piracy, efforts should be 
undertaken by the marine insurers to incorporate a definition of piracy into the 
various categories of marine insurance policies issued by them which will have a 
binding effect on the parties. While this suggestion might seem a little farfetched, it 
becomes justified considering the fact that the peril of piracy now seems to have 
occupied top spot in the rankings when considering the likelihood of the occurrence 
of any of the various perils insured in a marine insurance policy.  
  
Secondly, while the world is busy grappling with countermeasures on how to 
confront and combat piracy, especially as posed by the activities of pirates in 
Somalia. It seems to be ignoring the fact that the menace of piracy posed by these 
pirates is caused by lack of a working and effective government in Somalia as a 
result of the strife and war happening in that country. The only way to curtail the 
activities of pirates in the Gulf of Aden is to help Somalia ensure that peace returns 
once more to that country and ensuring that there is a stable and functioning 
government in place. A look has already been seen at how pirate attacks in the Gulf 
of Aden almost vanished during the brief reign of the Islamic Courts Union before 
they were sent packing by the foreign backed Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG), this only goes on to show the dividends which can be reaped from effecting 
stability in that country as well as in the other piracy endemic regions in which the 
governments have crucial internal issues which have destablising effects on those 
governments to combat piracy.  
 
Thirdly, there is the need to put in place a much needed punishment regime for 
pirates. The author is not unmindful of the fact that past experiences have shown that 
















Nevertheless, the awareness that certain punishment awaits a pirate will do well to 
act as a deterrent and to curb the incessant increase in the levels of pirate attacks and 
perhaps also help to dissuade would be pirates from becoming recruited into the 
dangerous „do or die‟ business of piracy. However, the present situation is that many 
countries are not willing to take on the prosecution of pirates because of the absence 
of municipal laws in such countries to prosecute apprehended pirates, the cost of 
prosecuting such captured pirates and the fact that such pirates if prosecuted and 
convicted might want to seek asylum in those countries after completing their terms. 
Many of the apprehended pirates are presently been taken to Kenya to be prosecuted, 
but current feedback suggests that there is a growing reluctance to continue to 
prosecute these pirates as it puts a strain on the justice system in that country. 
Therefore there is a need to have an International Court of Justice which shall have 
the primary role of prosecuting pirates. 
 
Finally, it is imperative that the above recommendations should be enforced in 
unison if there is indeed to be a conclusive end to piracy. The enforcement of these 
recommendations in a piecemeal fashion will only result in the fact that piracy will 
continue to resurface and perhaps metamorphose into a more dangerous hydra 
headed monster as pirates will continue to look for new avenues which would only 
assist in getting them miles ahead of efforts to curb the menace. As it is said, „if one 
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